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RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF COERCIVE
CREDITOR REMEDIES
Robert E. Scott*
The phenomenal growth of personal installment credit over the
past forty years' has generated inevitable pressures for regulatory re-
form of consumer credit markets. Much of the impetus for consumer
protection has stemmed from the perceived abuses that mark the pro-
cess of coercive collection upon default. Some of these abuses have
been identified, quite properly, as the sort of deceptive or fraudulent
practices often associated with industries experiencing rapid growth.
But other creditor remedies, though troublesome to many observers,
cannot be as easily characterized. For example, many critics have chal-
lenged the common practice of self-help repossession and resale of
consumer goods by secured creditors. Repossession belongs to a fam-
ily of contractually created remedies, including wage assignments, con-
fessions ofjudgment and waivers of exemption from execution, that is
often characterized as coercive. Creditors are assumed to use the
threat of these self-enforcing remedial options to coerce defaulting
debtors to agree to one-sided settlements.
The concept of "lost value" underlies the objection to most coer-
cive creditor remedies. 2 Creditors often pursue coercive collection in
cases in which the benefits to the creditor appear to be significantly less
than the costs imposed on the debtor. The punitive aspect of this de-
* Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law and Member, Center for Advanced Studies,
University of Virginia.
I would like to thank Ken Abraham, Richard Alderman, Frank Buckley, Robert
Cooter, Tom Jackson, John Jeffries, Saul Levmore, John Monahan, Alan Schwartz, Paul
Stephan, Bill Stuntz, Michael Trebilcock, William Whitford and the participants in work-
shops at McGill University, the University of Virginia and Columbia University for their
helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. From 1950 to 1971, personal installment debt grew by 500%. National Commis-
sion on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States 5-21 (1972). This
pattern has continued to the present. Thus, in 1971 outstanding consumer installment
debt totalled $105.7 billion. At the end of 1981, total consumer installment debt
amounted to $333.4 billion. National Consumer Finance Association, 1982 Finance
Fact Yearbook 41.
2. In this Article, I use "coercive collection" and "coercive creditor remedies" to
refer only to those self-enforcing remedies that are, at least to some extent, prior to and
independent of the alternative process ofpostjudgment execution. To be sure, all credi-
tor remedies, including postjudgment levy and execution, are coercive. But the fear is
that certain self-enforcing remedies are much more coercive and thus more harmful to
debtors than any corresponding benefits to creditors would justify. The concerns about
the undesirable effects of coercion are less acute in the case of postjudgment execution
because the state-supervised enforcement process embodies procedural safeguards that
moderate unwarranted and unfair collection behavior. This rhetorical limitation should
not obscure the fact that many of the same arguments for and against regulating these
remedial options might be applied to postjudgment collection. Nevertheless, self-en-
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struction of value forms the primary justification for the recently
promulgated Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices Rule,3 which
prohibits such common credit terms as blanket security interests in
household goods and contractual wage assignments. 4 Indeed, the lost
value assumption supplied the crucial argument that the benefits from
regulating creditor remedies were far greater than the costs: since the
prohibited practices are believed to cause more injury to consumers
than corresponding benefits to creditors, prohibition should have only
a modest effect on the price or the supply of installment credit.5
The lost-value thesis has also sparked a vigorous academic debate.
William Whitford, developing ideas first suggested by Arthur Leff, has
argued that information asymmetries lead to a systematic bargaining
impasse between debtors and creditors., This impasse results either in
repossessions that destroy value unnecessarily or in coercive threats
that induce debtors to accept unfavorable settlements.7 Alan Schwartz,
on the other hand, suggests that lost value is largely a perceptual illu-
sion fueled by would-be regulators' ignorance of the actual operation
of credit markets.8 While conceding the possibility that creditors may
forcing remedies are a useful and distinct paradigm for assessing the relationship be-
tween consumer debtors and their creditors.
A further problem with grouping the various self-enforcing remedies together is
that this classification tends to blur the fact that each of these remedies is different in
important respects. Ultimately, therefore, any policy analysis that points to specific legal
reform must pay greater attention to these differences. My purpose in writing this Arti-
cle is to encourage such a reexamination by focusing on previously neglected functions
of these coercive collection practices. Moreover, while these remedies have different
characteristics, there is substantial evidence that they function as substitutes for one an-
other. See infra note 26.
3. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.1-.5 (1988). The rule was upheld in
American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1011 (1986).
4. Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") rule, self-
enforcing remedies were used extensively in installment loan contracts. For example, in
1975, wage-assignment clauses appeared in 73.2%o of the installment loans made by
licensed lenders in New York. FTC, Trade Regulation Rule; Credit Practices, 49 Fed.
Reg. 7740, 7757 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Rule]. Such agreements were also widely em-
ployed by small loan and finance companies in California, Illinois and Michigan. Id.
The use of blanket security interests in household goods was even more widespread.
Household-goods clauses were used in a majority of finance company loan contracts.
Id. at 7762. In addition, banks, credit unions and occasionally savings and loan associa-
tions took such security interests. Id.
5. Id. at 7779-81.
6. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer Transactions,
7 Cardozo L. Rev. 959, 961-66 (1986) [hereinafter Whitford, The Appropriate Role of
Security Interests]; Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System,
1979 Wis. L. Rev. 1047, 1106-08 [hereinafter Whitford, A Critique]; see Leff, Injury,
Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970).
7. See Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests, supra note 6, at
964-65.
8. Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26J.L. &
Econ. 117, 139-48 (1983).
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threaten coercive action to induce repayment, Schwartz argues that
they will do so only when the action represents the cost-minimizing col-
lection option. 9
While this debate has resulted in sharp disagreements and diver-
gent normative recommendations, the participants nevertheless pro-
ceed from shared assumptions about the function of coercive creditor
remedies. The conventional assumption is that self-enforcing remedies
are designed principally (if not exclusively) to enhance the creditor's
prospect of repayment in the event of default. Thus, the debate contin-
ues over whether settlements induced by the threat of remedial action
are normatively undesirable, whether repossession destroys value or
whether regulation will motivate creditors to adopt more benign substi-
tutes.10 What has gone entirely unnoticed, however, is the possibility
that these remedial options also play a substantial role in the infinitely
larger class of consumer transactions in which the debtor does not
default. " I
This Article suggests that the conventional analysis is premised on
an unduly narrow conception of the function of creditor remedies and
of the debtor-creditor conflicts that they ameliorate. A single-minded
focus on the postdefault implications of coercive collection invariably
characterizes the debtor and creditor as locked in a zero-sum conflict
situation. The prohibition of certain remedies thus is seen solely in
terms of cost to the creditor, offset by corresponding gains for the
debtor. But if the relationship is viewed ex ante, debtor and creditor are
actually participants in a cooperative bargaining opportunity-an inter-
action in which both parties can mutually benefit from cooperation, but
in which each confronts the risk of defection by the other. Thus con-
ceived, the regulation of creditor remedies may have the perverse effect
of eliminating the very mechanisms used to ensure that the parties will
exploit fully their common interests.
Part I of the Article develops a conceptual framework for reevalu-
ating the function of various creditor remedies. A bargaining theory
approach suggests that many self-enforcing remedies may have a valua-
ble regulatory function, one that enables the parties to achieve mutually
advantageous objectives. From this ex ante perspective, the lost-value
potential inherent in certain remedial options is recharacterized as a
9. Id. at 151-52.
10. For a recent, and thoughtful, example of the conventional argument, see
Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade
Commission, 68 B.U.L. Rev. 349 (1988).
11. By any measure, default is not a common experience in consumer credit trans-
actions. Data on automobile loans, which constitute 37.9% of all installment credit, in-
dicates a yearly default rate that fluctuates between 3% and 6%. American Bankers
Association Installment Lending Division, Delinquency Rates on Bank Installment
Loans, 1982. Testimony before the FTC indicated that at any given time about 7% of
finance company accounts were past due. Creditors other than finance companies have
even lower delinquency rates. See FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7748.
732 [Vol. 89:730
COERCIVE CREDITOR REMEDIES
modern version of an ancient institution, the exchange of hostages.
The paradox of these collection mechanisms is that the greater the po-
tential lost value, the more effective the particular mechanism is in ad-
vancing the parties' cooperative goals. To be sure, once a debtor
defaults, the various collection options may appear to exacerbate costly
conflicts. In fact, however, the coercive postdefault environment is
caused by systematic information deficits and is largely independent of
the remedial options available to creditors.
Part II tests the validity of a bargaining theory approach to con-
sumer credit transactions. The principal question is whether the pat-
terns of interaction predicted by a cooperative bargaining model are
actually observed in consumer credit relationships. The available data
provide substantial support for the basic claims of this ex ante perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, the tentative state of the evidence suggests a further
inquiry: do the implications of the model hold even after all of its as-
sumptions are explicitly relaxed? Even in this more realistic setting, the
ex ante perspective offers valuable insights into the nature and function
of self-enforcing remedies.
Finally, Part III considers the normative implications of the bar-
gaining theory approach. From this perspective, conventional market-
failure justifications for prohibiting self-enforcing remedies are, at best,
problematic. The risk of systematic exploitation of consumer debtors is
most acute in currently unregulated transactions, such as purchase
money security interests in consumer durables. Moreover, disclosure
and other methods of information exchange offer more promise for
mitigating the undesirable effects of default. An alternative case for
current regulation rests on a credit-rationing objective: prohibition
may be designed to override the poor judgment of consumer debtors
by metering the supply of installment credit. Such a risk-regarding ra-
tionale accepts the likely increase in the cost of credit in order to pre-
vent systematic overcommitment by consumer debtors. But the ex ante
approach also challenges the poor-judgment case for prohibition. It is
simply perverse to prohibit commitments that restrain overconsump-
tion on the ground that, given their free choice, consumer debtors will
overconsume.
The only remaining case for the current scheme of regulation rests
on the "superfairness" idea of distributional equity. The prohibition of
creditor remedies does redistribute postdefault leverage from creditors
to those debtors who default, even though debtors committed to repay-
ment likely will bear much of the redistributional burden. Neverthe-
less, regulation reduces concentrated costs, whereas the unrestrained
use of self-enforcing terms would produce only diffused gains. If dif-
fused gains are weighted less in individuals' perceptions than concen-
trated losses, the parties may perceive the distribution as fair in the




I conclude from this analysis that the prohibition of selected credi-
tor remedies is unlikely to achieve the normative objective of reducing
postdefault coercion. A cooperative bargaining model shows that the
structural imperatives of the consumer credit transaction cannot be ig-
nored. If the coercion associated with postdefault maneuvering is nor-
matively undesirable, the most effective solution is to reduce the
information deficits that motivate postdefault actions. Otherwise, se-
lective regulation of particular terms inevitably will be trumped by the
pressure for substitute enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, if
the process of coercive collection is intrinsically a "bad thing," then the
culprit is the institution of consumer credit, not the self-enforcing
terms parties use to attempt to maximize the benefits available from the
relationship.
I. A COOPERATIVE BARGAINING THEORY OF THE
CONSUMER CREDIT TRANSACTION
A. The Regulation of Unfair Creditor Remedies
1. A Brief History of the Lost Value Hypothesis. - The consumer credit
industry has experienced rapid growth for over forty years. Growth in-
dustries are often characterized by fluid entry and exit of firms until a
competitive equilibrium is reached. Meantime, these unstable condi-
tions are a breeding ground for fraudulent and deceptive practices. It
is not surprising, therefore, that policymakers, accustomed to respond-
ing to one quick-buck scheme after another, developed a presumption
that the market for consumer credit was systematically, perhaps even
irredeemably, flawed.
12
As the consumer credit market stabilized, the incidence of fraud
and deceptive practices declined. Thus, the regulatory focus shifted to
a more subtle problem. Various self-enforcing remedies for default,
though not facially deceptive or fraudulent, often appeared "unfair" or
"coercive" when they were exercised. The injury to consumer debtors
caused by self-help repossession, confessed judgments or wage assign-
12. The relevant protective law is both state and federal. These laws regulate the
setting of permissible lending and credit charges, the disclosure of credit costs and
credit terms and a wide range of credit practices deemed to be unfair. Perhaps the most
important of these regulatory initiatives is the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601-1693r (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In addition to requiring uniform disclo-
sure of credit rates, the Act as amended regulates credit billings, consumer leases, gar-
nishments, consumer credit reporting, equal credit opportunity and debt-collection
practices. For a critical overview, see Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth
in Lending, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 711 (1979). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(U.C.C.C.) also regulates the terms of credit contracts, including the definition of de-
fault, U.C.C.C. § 5.109 (1974), the prohibition of contractual wage assignments, id.
§ 3.305, restrictions on blanket security interests, id. §§ 3.301-.302, and restrictions on
deficiency judgments, id. § 5.103. Various versions of the U.C.C.C. have been adopted
in ten states. See generally A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Princi-
ples and Policies 832-41 (1982) (discussing the U.C.C.C.'s consumer protections).
734 [Vol. 89:730
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ments frequently seemed greater than the corresponding benefits to
creditors. In many instances (automobile repossessions were only the
clearest examples), it seemed as though the exercise of these remedies
did not result in a straightforward transfer of property rights from de-
faulting debtors to creditors. Rather, resort to these remedial options
resulted in excessive destruction or "loss" of value, frequently leaving
debtors without the goods and with large deficiencies.13 Understand-
ably, these losses were attributed to the deliberate or careless failure of
creditors to maximize the returns from coercive collection.
In a pioneering paper, Arthur Leff shifted the debate from creditor
misbehavior to the structural dynamics of the postdefault collection
process. 14 Leff argued that lost value was an inevitable by-product of
the information asymmetries characteristic of the postdefault collection
process.' 5 These asymmetries generate costly and coercive maneuver-
ing by both parties-behavior that destroys the debtor's wealth without
greatly helping the creditor.'
6
This lost-value premise formed the basis for a widely accepted hy-
pothesis that both the threat and the exercise of self-help remedies
would, absent legal intervention, lead to normatively undesirable coer-
cion and exploitation of consumer debtors. The hypothesis was sup-
ported by several studies of automobile repossessions showing resales
of repossessed automobiles at substantially less than book wholesale
value.17 In response, a number of states enacted special legislation reg-
ulating self-enforcing remedies. Some states chose to ban deficiency
judgments in certain sales transactions,1 8 while others limited the en-
13. Any contractual remedy that requires a transfer of assets from one party to an-
other will cause the loss of value, since the transaction costs of effecting the transfer
always will be positive. The argument, therefore, is that certain self-enforcing remedies
destroy value gratuitously. Excessive value destruction may result because repossessing
creditors do not maximize the returns from resales, debtors attach idiosyncratic value to
the assets or enforcement causes debtors to suffer psychic or other consequential losses.
14. Leff, supra note 6.
15. Id. at 42-46.
16. Id. at 10-15.
17. See Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Reposses-
sion and Resale, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 20 (1969); White, Consumer Repossessions and Defi-
ciencies: New Perspectives from New Data, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 385 (1982); Note, Business
as Usual: An Empirical Study of Automobile DeficiencyJudgment Suits in the District of
Columbia, 3 Conn. L. Rev. 511 (1971) [hereinafter Note, Business as Usual]; Note, I
Can Get It for You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of Automobile Deficiency Judg-
ments, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1081 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.5 (West 1985) (banning deficiencies in all re-
sales of repossessed goods); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-5-103 (Bums 1982) (banning defi-
ciency in sales transactions when the sales price is below $1,000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
tit. 62A, § 9-501(1) (1966 & Supp. 1989) (banning deficiencies in all "purchase money
security interests in consumer goods"). Similar restrictions exist in Alabama, Arizona,




forcement of wage assignments,1 9 waivers of asset exemptions 20 and
confession of judgment clauses. 21 Finally, in 1984 the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") promulgated a Credit Practices Rule declaring
most self-enforcing remedies "unfair" to consumers. 22 The FTC relied
specifically on the lost-value premise in banning contract terms provid-
ing for blanket security interests in household goods, 23 wage assign-
ments, waivers of asset exemptions and confessions of judgment.
24
The FTC rule represents a significant expansion in the scale of reg-
ulation. While virtually every state previously had regulated some as-
pect of coercive collection,2 5 no state had prohibited the entire family
of terms now banned by the FTC rule. Furthermore, the various state
prohibitions did not seem to fall in any discernible pattern. In virtually
every state, at least one of the now-prohibited contractual remedies was
widely used, although the particular remedy of choice varied from state
to state.2
6
19. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-5-21(a) (1975) (assignment of future wages void);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-361a(i) (West Supp. 1988) (assignment void unless for pub-
lic welfare support, family support or union dues); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1321.32
(Baldwin 1982) (assignment void unless for child or spousal support). Wage assign-
ments are also prohibited in the states with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. See
U.C.C.C. § 3.305 (1974).
20. A number of jurisdictions prohibit some waivers of exemption based on the
strong public interest in protecting debtors and their families. See, e.g., Industrial Loan
& Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546, 209 P. 789 (1922) (prohibited in executory
contracts); Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 137 & n.6, 331 A.2d 452, 456 & n.6 (1975)
(citing cases).
21. Virtually all states impose some restrictions on the use of cognovit clauses.
Some states bar the use of confessions of judgment altogether. Other states restrict
their use in specified classes of transactions, such as retail installment sales contracts,
but do not impose a general prohibition on their use. For an example of the former, see
W. Va. Code § 46A-2-117 (1986). For an example of the latter, see Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 42-88 (West 1987) (confession ofjudgment void in retail installment contract or
installment loan contract).
22. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-.5 (1988).
23. The FTC rule defines household goods as "[c]lothing, furniture, appliances,
one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and personal effects
(including wedding rings) of the consumer and his or her dependents." Id. § 444.1(i).
24. See FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7743-45. There are a number of specific
problems with the FTC rule as it is currently formulated. Most of the difficulties result
from the overly broad prohibition of nonpurchase money security interests in household
goods. The prohibition of security interests in household goods is not necessary to
achieve the rule's objective. A valid, perfected security interest under article 9 of the
U.C.C. gives the secured creditor priority rights vis-A-vis other creditors as well as de-
fault rights vis-i-vis the debtor. Thus, a creditor may be motivated to take security to
ensure a priority position in any distribution of the debtor's assets irrespective of the
right to foreclose against the collateral upon default. If the purpose of the FTC rule is
solely to prohibit coercive remedies, then the rule should prohibit self-help repossession
rather than ban security interests altogether.
25. See, e.g., supra notes 18-21.
26. There is substantial evidence that provisions for wage assignments, security in-
terests in household goods, cognovit clauses and exemption waivers function as substi-
[Vol. 89:730736
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2. The Current Debate Over Self-Enforcing Remedies. - The FTC ra-
tionale for regulation focused on the problem of lost value as a generic
phenomenon. The FTC found that the prohibited remedies impose
much greater injury on consumers than any benefits they provide for
creditors.2 7 From this premise it was a simple step to conclude that the
practices were "unfair" under a cost-benefit calculus. Further, the FTC
concluded that regulation was justified because inherent information
deficits prevented consumers from perceiving the potential for lost
value and negotiating contracts without the suspect terms.28 Moreover,
the inability of particular creditors to capture the benefits from innova-
tion discouraged creditors in general from offering consumer contracts
without the "harmful" clauses. Finally, the FTC concluded that the ef-
fects of prohibition on either the cost or supply of credit were likely to
be insubstantial since the prohibited practices did not offer meaningful
benefits to creditors in the first place.
29
Recently, William Whifford has developed the lost-value thesis as a
criterion for discriminating among different remedial options.
30
Whitford focuses on the case of a creditor holding a security interest in
the debtor's household goods. There are several reasons to believe
that the value of the goods to the debtor (Vd) will exceed the value of
the goods to the creditor (Vc). The debtor may have invested human
capital in learning the particular characteristics of these goods, en-
abling her to exploit their use more fully. Furthermore, the debtor may
tutes for one another. For example, in California, where repossession and resale were
regulated, wage assignments were prevalent. FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7757. In New
York, where confession of judgment was regulated, waivers of exemption were widely
used (75% of the cash loan contracts), id. at 7769 n.10, as were wage assignments (68%
of the small loan contracts), id. at 7757. Of those self-enforcing terms prohibited by the
FTC rule, the most prevalent were security interests in household goods. Results of a
survey of some 10,000 consumer accounts revealed that 76% of the precomputed loan
contracts contained clauses authorizing household-goods security interests. Id. at 7762
n.12.
27. See, e.g., id. at 7767 ("Although the capacity to disrupt the home of a consumer
and his or her family has some value to a creditor, the practice elicits minimal benefits in
return for substantial injury.").
28. See id. at 7762-65.
29. See id. at 7745-47. The FTC based its judgment that the costs of prohibition
were likely to be negligible on several grounds. First, it gathered statistics on the effects
of selective regulation of self-enforcing remedies in states that already had enacted re-
strictions comparable to the proposed rule. This data indicated that interest rates would
be unlikely to rise if any one of the family of self-enforcing terms was prohibited. Id. at
7780-81. Unfortunately, the FTC did not consider the possibility that these remedies
may be substitutes, which appears to be the case, see supra note 26. Since no state had
prohibited all of the remedies banned by the proposed rule, the conclusions drawn from
this data are problematic. The FTC, however, did commission several econometric
studies of the likely effects of the proposed rule. The most sensitive of these studies
suggested that the rule would cause an increase in the cost of credit of approximately
0.2%. FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7779-80.




attach sentimental or idiosyncratic value to the goods. Finally, the re-
possession may impose psychic costs on the debtor, destroying the au-
tonomy values attached to ownership of the goods.
Whitford then poses the following conundrum: if there is no pros-
pect of collecting a deficiency, the parties should settle whenever Vd
exceeds Vc. The debtor should pay the creditor some premium greater
than Vc but less than Vd to forego its right to repossess. Nevertheless,
Whitford claims, the evidence shows that creditors frequently do not
settle.31 Rather,, the parties reach an impasse and the creditor repos-
sesses the goods, leading to a destruction of value. Furthermore, even
if the creditor and debtor do settle, the outcome is coercive since it is
reached only after both sides exercise strategic leverages. 32 The credi-
tor can threaten to destroy the premium value the debtor attaches to
the goods, while the debtor can threaten to declare bankruptcy, convert
the goods into exempt assets or otherwise engage in strategic delay.
Whitford concludes that the problem lies in the use of self-help reme-
dies, such as security interests in household goods. He argues for regu-
lation that would channel the parties into remedial options such as
wage garnishment for which potential lost value and its resulting coer-
cion are unlikely.33
Alan Schwartz has challenged the lost-value thesis in an article ar-
guing for the enforcement of security interests in consumer goods.34
Schwartz accepts the conceptual framework of the lost-value theorists
and their focus on the postdefault relationship, but he challenges the
assumption that lost value is a prevalent phenomenon. 35 The condi-
tions for a substantial destruction of value are unlikely to occur gener-
ally since a debtor's human capital investment in consumer goods is
trivial, and the claim for psychic losses is entirely uncertain and specu-
lative. Some debtors may have an idiosyncratic attachment to the
goods, but this overvaluation will not be systematic. In any event, no
debtor would knowingly grant the creditor a security interest in goods
that he values more than the creditor does. In short, "repossession im-
poses trivial harms, no harms at all, or harms that cannot be shown to
exceed the gains [to creditors], depending on how one considers the
harm to have been inflicted."'36 Thus, Schwartz concludes that the lost-
value conundrum and the alleged coercion resulting from creditors'
31. Id. at 964.
32. Id. at 964-65.
33. Id. at 970-74.
34. See Schwartz, supra note 8.
35. Id. at 139-48.
36. Id. at 147. It is important to note that Schwartz does not challenge the idea that
debtors may hold assets to which they attach idiosyncratic or sentimental value. Rather,
he argues that there is no reason to believe that debtors systematically would offer such
assets as security. The cooperative model developed below argues, to the contrary, that
there are good reasons for debtors systematically to offer such assets as security. Thus,
the model shows that lost value is, at least in theory, a prevalent phenomenon.
[Vol. 89:730
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threats to repossess are largely cognitive illusions37 fueled by creditors'
quite justifiable inclination to wholesale repossessed goods.38
3. The Limits of Conventional Analyses: The Zero-Sum Assumption.
The current debate over lost value and its subsidiary issues (Do repos-
sessing creditors systematically fail to maximize resales? Does self-help
collection cause undesirable coercion?) remains unresolved largely be-
cause of a lingering uncertainty: are there any benign reasons why
debtors would systematically grant creditors the opportunity to exercise
postdefault leverage? The advocates of regulation argue that such lev-
erage is both common and exploitative.39 They attribute the general
use of such devices to market failures, cognitive errors and the unequal
distribution of economic power between creditors and consumer debt-
ors. Opponents of regulation, on the other hand, assert that the threat
of lost value does not occur systematically and, when such leverage
does exist, the resulting "coercion" is not normatively undesirable.
40
Interestingly, even though current analyses reach different conclu-
sions, they all would answer the question posed earlier in exactly the
same way: no, there is no good reason for debtors to give lost-value
leverage to creditors. 4' The debate, then, proceeds from the same as-
sumption. One side argues that the ad hoc evidence of lost valuejusti-
37. Id. at 139-48. Schwartz demonstrates that it would be irrational for secured
creditors wishing to maximize profits to fail to maximize resale proceeds, unless each
creditor acts in concert with others. Id. at 131-39. He then shows that creditor cartels
are unlikely to exist. Id. The analysis is incomplete, however, because Schwartz as-
sumes that creditors count only the monetary benefits of resale. See id. at 124. His
discussion of repossession as a signalling mechanism focuses solely on its effects on
debtors. See id. at 151-52. But the signalling aspect of repossession also affects credi-
tors. By reducing the default rate of other debtors, signalling through repossession al-
lows creditors potentially to maximize profits without maximizing resale proceeds.
38. Schwartz justifies wholesaling on the ground that a dealer with experience in
selling used goods can resell a good more cheaply than a creditor whose expertise is
lending money. Id. at 130-32.
39. For example, Professor Whitford has observed that postdefault "leverage arises
because the creditor has the capacity to take action of little direct benefit to itself but of
great harm to the debtor. Our culture objects to gaining bargaining power solely by
threatening to hurt another." Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests,
supra note 6, at 990.
40. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 149-51 ("That creditors commonly so act should now
seem less plausible .... [But] good reasons exist to make in terrorem repossessions,
supposing them to occur. They may encourage repayment at least cost to debtors as a
group .... ").
41. See, e.g., id. at 140 ("These harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly
informed of the consequences of granting security. If security imposed greater expected
harms on debtors than it created expected gains for creditors, creditors could not
purchase the consent of debtors to grant it."); Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Se-
curity Interests, supra note 6, at 982 ("[Regulation] can be seen as one more case in
which the law steps in paternalistically to counteract a natural human tendency to favor
immediate gratification-in this instance, more credit at lower prices-at the expense of
protection from long-term risk.").
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fies regulation, while the other argues that the evidence is misleading
and the problem does not exist.
This common starting point can be traced to a single-minded focus
on the postdefault relationship between debtor and creditor. Viewed ex
post, creditor and debtor participate in what is essentially a zero-sum
game. The outcome of a pure conflict situation inevitably results in a
winner and a loser. Thus conceived, contract rights, including self-en-
forcing remedies, are part of the leverage available to creditors in seek-
ing an advantageous resolution to the dispute. Consequently, the
debate centers on whether the leverage is likely to be coercive (Is there
a threat of destroyed value?) and the social and moral implications if it
is coercive (Is coercion a bad thing?).
To be sure, the postdefault relationship between creditor and
debtor is not strictly a zero-sum game. In the strict zero-sum game,
there is no opportunity for cooperation or mutual advantage. Any gain
for one player is offset by an equivalent loss for the other. Neverthe-
less, the zero-sum characterization of the postdefault relationship has
useful heuristic value. It emphasizes the point that few opportunities
for mutual advantage exist once default occurs. Even agreements to
withhold imposing costs on each other are problematic since the exer-
cise of such leverage is a crucial part of a winning strategy.
But the zero-sum conceptualization is fundamentally flawed irre-
spective of the possibilities of cooperative settlement. By focusing ex-
clusively on the postdefault effects of creditor leverage, the current
debate suffers from a curious myopia. Indeed, the myopia is not lim-
ited to the narrow question of lost-value leverage. A number of influ-
ential commentators have attempted to justify or explain, on various
grounds, prohibitions on other terms in credit contracts, such as waiv-
ers of the debtor's right to seek a discharge in bankruptcy. 42 In each
case, the analysis ignores the possibility that these provisions, which
seem suspect after default, may play a valuable role in successfully reg-
ulating those credit relationships in which the debtor does not default.
This is the peculiar problem of legal analysis. It concentrates on the
transactions that break down rather than on those that succeed. I pro-
pose, therefore, to reconceptualize the debate by focusing on the ex ante
relationship of the parties. From that perspective, the debtor-creditor
relationship reappears as a cooperative bargaining opportunity-an in-
teraction in which both parties are motivated to pursue mutual advan-
tage, although each faces continuing temptations to defect from the
common goal.
42. See, e.g., Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1393, 1404-24 (1985) (justifying regulation as a corrective for impulsive behavior and
systematic judgmental errors); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale
L.J. 763, 784-86 (1983) (justifying regulation as a means of preserving personal integ-
rity). For an analysis and further discussion of these arguments from the perspective
suggested by this Article, see infra Part III.
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B. The Consumer Credit Transaction as a Cooperative Bargaining Opportunity
Consider the hypothesis that self-enforcing remedies are part of a
complex regulatory scheme designed to enforce an agreement that is
mutually advantageous to both parties. From this ex ante perspective,
the consumer credit transaction resembles a cooperative bargaining op-
portunity-one in which the parties have incentives to form agreements
in order to promote their mutual interests, but in which each faces the
temptation thereafter to defect from the common objective.
The bargaining theory approach developed below will show that
institutional impediments to legally enforceable contracting compel
creditors and debtors to construct self-enforcing mechanisms to
achieve their mutually desired objectives. The principal instruments
available to the parties are contract terms providing for a reciprocal set
of commitments designed to ensure that the objectives are achieved.
Viewed in isolation or after the fact, these terms may seem harsh or
difficult to rationalize with fully informed choice. But in the context of
a cooperative bargaining situation, they appear as a useful regulatory
mechanism designed to achieve a measure of mutual discipline and
control. This mechanism has costs when the debtor defaults, but it is
important to appreciate its value in improving the parties' capacity to
achieve mutually desired and socially productive goals.
1. A Model of the Ex Ante Bargain.
a. Background Assumptions and Starting Points: The Enforcement Di-
lemma - Assume a world in which consumer credit transactions are ne-
gotiated individually. Creditors are firms that issue credit in a
competitive environment characterized by easy entry and exit of capital.
Debtors are solvent individuals who repay current obligations out of
future income. All debtors have the right to a discharge in bankruptcy
of any obligations they incur. Assume further that Creditor and Debtor
enter into negotiations leading to a $10,000 extension of credit that
Debtor will repay in fixed installments. For purposes of the model, as-
sume that both parties are rational actors, intent on maximizing their
individual utility. Each party's objective is to minimize the costs of en-
dogenous risks (those events within at least the partial control of one or
the other) that will otherwise threaten successful performance of the
credit contract.
43
With these assumptions, the various factors that will influence the
parties' agreement can be illustrated by a bargaining interaction in
which each party has a pair of alternatives from which to choose.
44
Each of the four possible combined choices yields a particular gain or
43. All of these very strong assumptions are explicitly relaxed infra in Part IIB,
which tests the implications of the model in more realistic settings.
44. The cooperative bargaining model developed below builds on Thomas
Schelling's pioneering work in applied game theory. See T. Schelling, The Strategy of
Conflict 21-52 (1960); Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281
(1956).
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loss for Creditor and a particular gain or loss for Debtor. Each party's
choices will depend, in part, on the choice the other makes. Figure 1
represents the relationship between Creditor and Debtor in a two-di-
mensional graph, with Creditor's gains measured vertically and
Debtor's horizontally and the values of the four combined choices








0 10 20 30 40 50 DEBTOR
Creditor can choose either C (lend the $10,000) or c (invest the
resources elsewhere). Debtor faces a choice between D (repay the loan
in installments) and d (retain her income and accumulate savings). The
dilemma facing Creditor and Debtor can now be seen quite clearly. So-
lution cd is a "minimax"-that is, it represents the outcome that mini-
mizes the maximum risk of loss for both parties. 45 Either can achieve cd
by itself, and neither can threaten the other with anything worse. Thus,
it represents the "no contract" outcome, combining the returns to
Creditor from its next best investment opportunity and the welfare po-
sition of Debtor if she accumulates the $10,000 through individual
savings.
Both parties would prefer CD, which represents the gains possible
from the successful performance of an installment loan agreement. In
order to reach CD, however, the parties must either trust each other or
be able to make enforceable promises. This is because there is an in-
45. See T. Schelling, supra note 44, at 48-49; see also R. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games
and Decisions 275-309 (1957) (discussing the "minimax," as well as other well-known
criteria for making decisions under conditions of uncertainty); Arrow, Alternative Ap-
proaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations, 19 Econometrica 404
(1951) (surveying theories of choice in the face of uncertain consequences).
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herent first-mover disadvantage in the consumer credit transaction. As
first mover, if Creditor chooses C (to lend Debtor the $10,000), Debtor
has an incentive to choose d (default, retain her income and accumulate
savings instead of repaying the loan) in order to secure her maximum
gain at Cd. But solution Cd represents Creditor's maximum loss, moti-
vating it to choose c instead.
46
In an ordinary contractual relationship, the legally enforceable
promise resolves this dilemma. Creditor promises to lend Debtor
$10,000, and Debtor promises to repay the loan with interest in stated
installments. Either party can rely on legal enforcement to ensure that
they achieve the cooperative result CD. Unhappily, two factors in the
consumer credit transaction impair the efficacy of the simple contract as
a solution to the bargaining dilemma. First, if Debtor subsequently de-
faults, state law significantly restricts Creditor's ability to collect out of
Debtor's current or future assets.47 Moreover, even this limited option
to enforce the promise to repay is subject to Debtor's decision to seek a
discharge in bankruptcy, an option that grants Debtor a fresh start
unencumbered by Creditor's claim.48 Singly or in combination, these
46. In addition to the three possibilities discussed in the text, solution cD remains a
possible choice point as well. This option assumes that Creditor initially commits funds
to Debtor, but subsequently recaptures the economic value of the loan (choice c) by
inducing default even though Debtor is committed to repayment (choice D). This would
be a sensible strategy for Creditor whenever changed circumstances (such as a shift in
interest rates) make alternative investments (choice c) more attractive than the decision
to commit the funds to this Debtor (choice C). This risk of creditor misbehavior is ex-
plored more fully below. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
47. Debtors are entitled in all states to hold designated assets exempt from credi-
tors' claims. Two examples of such protection are the exemptions of wage substitutes-
such as pension funds and retirement income-and certain durable goods. See, e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.010(a), (b) (West 1987) (exempting motor vehicles); id.
§ 704.100(a), (c) (life insurance policies); id. § 704.110(d) (proceeds from public retire-
ment benefits); see generally T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law
264-72 (1986) (discussing attributes of exempt property). A number of states restrict
the debtor's freedom to waive these exemptions. See supra note 20. In addition, the
limitations on prejudgment attachment offer debtors the opportunity to use strategic
delay in order to secure a more advantageous settlement. Postjudgment collection is
similarly restricted. Wage garnishment is regulated by both state and federal law. Typi-
cally, a wage garnishment order in most states applies only to a single pay period, re-
quiring a second garnishment proceeding for all but the smallest debts. See Whitford,
The Appropriate Role of Security Interests, supra note 6, at 967-68. Federal law puts a
ceiling on the available wage garnishment, equal to 25% of the individual's disposable
weekly earnings or the amount by which those earnings exceed 30 times the federal
hourly minimum wage, whichever is less. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). From a historical perspective,
discharge is a relatively recent addition to bankruptcy law. See Jackson, supra note 42,
at 1395 n.5. In order to obtain a discharge, the debtor must turn over all nonexempt
assets to the bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1982). The exemptions granted
an individual debtor in bankruptcy, however, are likely to be significantly greater than
those afforded by state law. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522, the debtor may exempt either any
property exempt under federal, state or local law or elect a laundry list of exemptions,
including $7500 in a homestead, $1200 in an automobile, $4000 in household goods,
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institutional constraints impair the parties' ability to rely on enforce-
able promises to achieve their objective.
The problem would not be severe if the only possible misbehavior
of a solvent debtor were the bald-faced decision to default, accumulate
exempt assets and declare bankruptcy. In that case, Creditor might be
willing to trust that the punishing effects of such behavior on Debtor's
reputation would effectively deter all but the most egregious cheaters.
Creditor, however, is more acutely concerned with other, more subtle
forms of misbehavior-actions that may ultimately impair Debtor's
ability to repay even if she has a sincere desire to do so. 49
b. Conflicts of Interest: A Typology of Debtor Misbehavior. - The bar-
gaining dilemma of the parties can be seen more clearly by reviewing
the variety of ways Debtor can cheat so as to leave Creditor with its
maximum loss at Cd.50 The most obvious form of misbehavior is con-
version. Debtor may consciously accept Creditor's money and then
convert the income committed to repayment into exempt assets prior
to seeking a bankruptcy discharge. Reputational constraints, as well as
social norms of reciprocity, trust and promise keeping, regulate this be-
havior in many instances. 51 Thus, Creditor may not regard the threat
of conversion as sufficiently serious to cause it to force the no-contract
option cd (or to increase the interest rates and, in effect, move point CD
closer to the minimax solution).
Creditor, however, is also concerned with more subtle conflicts of
$500 in family jewelry, $750 in professional tools and $4000 in unmatured life insur-
ance. I 1 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Furthermore, notwithstanding any
waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid any lien on such exempt property, including
a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in household goods, jewelry or
professional tools and implements. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982).
49. Even in a competitive market, where debtors have a strong desire to establish
credibility so as to engage in future contractual relationships, reputation, good will and
the benefits of repeat business, do not completely deter the temptation to evade contrac-
tual responsibilities. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Con-
tractual Performance, 89J. Pol. Econ. 615, 618-25 (1981).
50. The following discussion builds on the analysis in Scott, A Relational Theory of
Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 919-22 (1986).
51. "[G]roup-generated norms, individual ethics, and other informal mechanisms
play important roles in regulating contractual relationships." Scott, Conflict and Coop-
eration in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 2005, 2040 (1987); see id. at 2040-42.
The pervasive social norm of reciprocity offers a peculiarly stable foundation for a strat-
egy of conditional cooperation between contractors. See Gouldner, The Norm of Reci-
procity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 Am. Soc. Rev. 161, 172-76 (1960) (reciprocity
functions as a stabilizing force, cementing social relationships and discouraging ex-
ploitation); E. Walster, G. Walster & E. Berscherd, Equity: Theory and Research 6-8,
15-16 (1978) (socially generated norms of equity discourage individuals from following
their natural inclinations to maximize their own outcomes at others' expense). But
norms of reciprocity and trust, standing alone, cannot guarantee a cooperative equilib-
rium. This is especially true when the prospect of future interactions between the par-
ties is insufficient to discipline present temptations to defect from the cooperative norm.
See Scott, supra, at 2024-30.
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interest. For instance, one widely recognized conflict is the danger that
once credit is granted (Creditor chooses C), Debtor will increase the
riskiness of her future income stream.52 She may decide, for instance,
to invest the borrowed funds in high-risk investments. This behavior,
which we might call risky business, permits Debtor to gamble with
Creditor's funds.53 If the venture is successful, all the returns in excess
of the debt payments accrue to Debtor. If the venture fails, Debtor, by
declaring bankruptcy, imposes much of the loss on Creditor.
5 4
A related conflict is the threat that Debtor may, dilute Creditor's
claim to Debtor's nonexempt assets. For instance, Debtor may overex-
tend her capacity to repay by securing additional credit from other
financers, who will then compete with the original creditor in any distri-
bution of assets upon default.5 5 A promise not to incur further indebt-
edness does not solve the problem of overextension since the promise
itself may be rendered unenforceable by subsequent bankruptcy.
Finally, Creditor may also be concerned about the vexing problem
of shirking (or inadequate effort). The income to repay the loan is gen-
erated. solely by Debtor's efforts. The promise to assign a portion of
that future income to Creditor necessarily reduces, at least to some ex-
tent, Debtor's incentive vigorously to pursue income-generating activi-
ties. Instead, at least some of Debtor's efforts may be diverted to other
activities for which all the returns are retained by Debtor. The shirking
conflict means that debtors burdened with installment obligations will
fail to exploit fully their income-generating opportunities even when
further efforts would enhance the prospects of repayment in full at
point CD (the optimal result).
This last conflict of interest merely illustrates the general principle
that a contracting party, obligated to extend efforts on behalf of herself
and her partner, systematically will fail to exercise the effort necessary
to maximize the mutual interests of both when a part of the returns
from the contractual efforts must be repaid to the other in the form of a
fixed royalty, commission or, as in this case, installment debt.5 6 Such
arrangements skew the congruence of interests between Debtor and
Creditor concerning the appropriate level of effort to be expended in
reaching the cooperative goal of full performance at point CD.
52. SeeJackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
Yale L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 Yale LJ. 49, 52-53 (1982).
53. The economist's designation of this conflict as "asset substitution" can be mis-
leading. The conflict arises any time Debtor makes a financing or an investment deci-
sion that increases the variability of the expected returns. Frequently, Debtor's strategy
will be to "put all her eggs in a single basket."
54. Scott, supra note 50, at 919.
55. The problem of claim dilution is especially troubling to Creditor when Debtor
can use this additional debt to pursue high-risk, high-return financing options.
56. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089,
1112-26 (1981).
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How can these conflicts be resolved without recourse to legally en-
forceable contracts? It is important to see that at this initial stage of the
Debtor-Creditor interaction, both parties have an equal incentive to
structure their relationship so as to control these future conflicts. If
they are unable to do so, they inevitably will choose the no-contract
point cd and forfeit the mutual benefits that can be derived from the
relationship.
c. The Debtor's Commitment. - The parties must find some forms or
terms of agreement that either reduce the incentives to cheat or that
impose enforceable penalties. The possibility of trust between Credi-
tor and Debtor should not be dismissed, but neither can it be presup-
posed. Indeed, trust is often achieved by the continuity of the
relationship between the parties.5 7 In the installment-loan context,
however, the future casts an insufficient shadow over the present to dis-
cipline reliably the current behavior of the parties.58
The structure of the bargain can be changed, and the prospect of
successful performance at CD improved, if Debtor can signal effectively
to Creditor that she will not default and choose d if Creditor chooses C
(to grant the credit). She can accomplish this only by overcoming
Creditor's fear of being disadvantaged as the first mover. Debtor's
choice, quite simply, is to assume a commitment-that is, to make a
promise to choose D (full repayment) subject to a strong penalty in the
event she should thereafter misbehave in any of the ways that will lead
to default (and to the defecting outcome Cd). The possibility of making
a commitment allows Debtor to overcome some of the deficiencies in
legal enforcement. Debtor assumes a commitment to repayment (D)
and Creditor chooses either c (to invest elsewhere) or C (to grant the
credit and accept repayment). Thus, the no-contract minimax of cd is
avoided. 59
The efficacy of this decision depends entirely on Debtor's ability to
57. See T. Schelling, supra note 44, at 134-35. A number of studies establish the
significance of a prior reputation for being trustworthy in influencing the outcome of
strategic interaction games. Investigators have shown that credible promises (those
made by parties historically known to keep their word) induce more cooperation than
promises made by parties with no established reputation. See, e.g., Gahagan &
Tedeschi, Strategy and the Credibility of Promises in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 12
J. Conflict Resolution 224, 229-31 (1968).
58. A precomputed loan is a relatively discrete transaction, in which the parties will
not face repeated opportunities to adjust cooperatively over time. In the absence of a
relationship that will encourage cooperative patterns of interaction, Creditor must de-
pend on Debtor's incentive to maintain a market reputation for reliability. Klein and
Leffler have shown that, even in a competitive market, the desire to maintain a reputa-
tion for credibility will not be sufficient to deter the temptation to shirk on contractual
responsibilities. See Klein & Leffier, supra note 49, at 618-25. The logic is that Debtor
can always borrow from new entrants in the credit market. Creditor, realizing this, can-
not rely on Debtor's desire to maintain a good reputation as a sufficient enforcement
bond.
59. See T. Schelling, supra note 44, at 121-22.
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commit herself credibly to enforce the commitment against herself. In
this case, Debtor must find a way to commit herself not to exploit the
available option of bankruptcy discharge in order to escape the repay-
ment obligation. Under current law, her range of choices is somewhat
constrained. One obvious possibility is simply to waive her right to dis-
charge this debt. But such waivers, even if freely and intelligently
made, are unenforceable. 60 As an alternative, Debtor may choose to
grant Creditor property rights in Debtor's nonexempt assets. A secur-
ity interest in nonexempt assets, such as Debtor's automobile, will sur-
vive bankruptcy 6' and provide Creditor the option of repossessing the
collateral upon default.
The right to repossess the automobile is not an assurance that, if
Debtor defaults, the asset will be sufficient to repay the debt. That may
or may not be the case. Instead, the value of the commitment derives
from the penalty that it imposes upon Debtor, not from the benefit that
it offers Creditor. An effective commitment by Debtor includes any ma-
neuver that will leave Debtor in the position for which the option of
choosing to default (d) is no longer realistic because it imposes more
costs than any benefits Debtor could derive from cheating. A credible
commitment thus requires Debtor to assume a sufficiently severe pen-
alty so that in all cases she would prefer to carry out her promise to pay
in full (to choose D).
Thus conceived, granting Creditor the right of repossession allows
Debtor to offer an economic hostage that accomplishes two critical
functions. First, it signals to Creditor that Debtor is not one of those
likely to defect by engaging in any of the types of misbehavior that
would lead to Cd.62 In addition, the hostage serves a crucial bonding
function. It ensures that Debtor's resolve to follow those steps neces-
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("A discharge... operates as
an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action .... or an act, to
collect... any such debt.., whether or not discharge of such debt is waived ... .
61. See id. § 522.
62. See Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ.
Inquiry 188, 196-97 (1984). Signalling theory, standing alone, does not fullyjustify the
use of self-enforcing remedies. There is substantial question whether, in equilibrium,
such signalling will, in fact, produce better matches between creditors and debtors. If
there is too much signalling in equilibrium (because the signal is insufficiently informa-
tive), the social cost of using coercive remedies for these purposes may outweigh any
informational advantages. See Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A
Review of Current Theories, 10J. Legal Stud. 1, 14-21 (1981). Under these circum-
stances, debtors as a group would be better off if the signalling device were banned.
The model proposed in this Article avoids this problem by linking the signal to debtors'
precontract incentives. Thus, the signal works precisely because high-risk debtors can
bind themselves to the results of the screening mechanism. Stephen Ross has developed
a similar argument to explain the financing decisions of firms as signals to other partici-
pants in the market. Ross links the signal to the incentive system of the firm's managers.
Thus, the firm is signalling that it has structured its managers' incentives so as to mini-
mize the possibility that the managers can misbehave. See Ross, The Determination of
Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 Bell J. Econ. 23 (1977).
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sary to achieve full performance at CD will continue unabated through-
out the duration of the relationship. 63
d. The Risk of Creditor Misbehavior. - Self-help repossession appears
to offer the parties some hope of achieving the cooperative solution CD.
Several drawbacks to the use of economic hostages, however, must be
evaluated carefully. First, information barriers may prevent Debtor
from revealing her value system so as to make the commitment credi-
ble. For example, the medieval king who sends a member of his en-
tourage as a hostage to his enemy's court may be unable to alleviate the
realistic fear that the king actually dislikes the hostage. One solution to
the credibility problem is to offer as a hostage something of obvious
value to anyone. Thus, the medieval monarch might choose as a hos-
tage the most fearsome warrior in the realm. In the modern analogue,
Debtor could offer a security interest in assets, such as the family jew-
elry, that have a ready market value equal to or greater than the out-
standing debt.64
But this option, in turn, raises a further problem. If the hostage
has independent value to Creditor, there is a heightened risk that Cred-
itor will defect. Creditor may, for example, induce or fabricate a de-
fault after partial repayment, use the hostage to satisfy the old
obligation and earn a further premium by investing the funds else-
where. 65 This option is reflected in Figure 166 by the outcome cD,
which represents Creditor's maximum gain and Debtor's maximum
loss. Both parties profit, therefore, when Debtor's commitment to re-
pay is credible, but Creditor is not enticed by the desirability of the
hostage to the extent that it would rather keep the hostage than receive
repayment.
In terms of the medieval monarch, this problem is best resolved by
63. The bonding function is independent of the signalling function. Even when
Debtor's characteristics and reputation are well-known, agreeing to a self-enforcing
remedy serves an important precommitment function in controlling expost misbehavior.
Thus, the signalling function of self-enforcing terms focuses on ex ante contract negotia-
tion, while the bonding function focuses on expost contract enforcement. See Grossman
& Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in The Economics of
Information and Uncertainty 107, 109-10 (J. McCall ed. 1982).
64. The original hostage imagery is Thomas Schelling's. See T. Schelling, supra
note 44, at 135-36; see also Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 522-26 (1983) (formally developing a hos-
tage model in the context of private ordering in intermediate product markets).
65. The risk of induced breach is a function of the "breacher-status" problem. See
Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obli-
gation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 983 (1983). Any contract breacher, including a defaulting
debtor, is liable for compensatory damages. But frequently overlooked is that a
breacher will also lose his accrued interest in what may be very valuable return rights.
Thus, there are advantages to a creditor inducing a default whenever interest rates rise
or other market risks result in a debt contract favorable to the debtor.
66. See supra p. 742.
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the king offering to his enemy his sickly son, the "puny prince." 67 The
value of the commitment of the puny prince lies in the king's love and
affection for his son despite the prince's lack of physical strength. Yet
the concomitant risk that the creditor monarch will provoke a default
and make off with the hostage similarly is reduced since the puny prince
is of little use as a warrior to anyone else. The puny prince theme sug-
gests that for cases in which Debtor is offering assets as security, the
ideal choices are family heirlooms, household goods, future human
capital or indeed any other entitlements that have substantial idiosyn-
cratic or sentimental value to Debtor.68 In short, the cooperative game
reconceptualizes the lost-value differential, which seems so ominous
once Debtor defaults, as the ideal economic hostage necessary to en-
sure the mutually beneficial outcome CD.
e. The Creditor's Commitment. - Upon reflection, however, there is a
problem with the commitment of economic assets whose value to
Debtor is largely idiosyncratic. Once Debtor defaults, the value of the
hostage to Creditor may well be negligible. Debtor may now assume
that Creditor will not exercise its legal right of repossession since re-
possession costs may well exceed any benefits in resale value. Yet, if
the parties realize this possibility at the time of contracting, the entire
cooperative sequence may unravel. In this circumstance, Creditor has
an incentive to bind itself by committing to repossess upon default even
though the cost may exceed the benefits. Unlike Debtor's commitment,
the distinctive characteristic of Creditor's commitment is that Creditor
has no intrinsic incentive to carry the act out either before the event or
after. But it does have an incentive to bind itself to fulfill the pledge if it
thinks the commitment is likely to succeed, since it is the making of the
commitment to repossess, not its fulfillment, that gains the objective.69
Creditor, in committing to repossess upon default, must arrange
its actions so as to demonstrate that it does have an incentive to fulfill
the pledge if default occurs. But how can Creditor commit itself in ad-
vance to an action that it would prefer not to take if the event occurs?
The difficulty, of course, arises from the fact that once default occurs,
the incentive to respond by repossession or other means largely disap-
pears. Thus, Creditor must demonstrate to Debtor how difficult it
would be to undo the commitment after the fact.70 One way of making
67. See Scott, supra note 50, at 930.
68. These assets are largely exempt from creditors' claims in bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Thus, self-enforcing terms are the only feasi-
ble way for Debtor to offer assets with idiosyncratic or premium value as a commitment
to the cooperative objective.
69. See T. Schelling, supra note 44, at 35-38.
70. Given this situation, it is important for Creditor to tie its hands as much as
possible. See id. at 40-41. Developing a reputation for carrying out the threat is impor-
tant for Creditor because once Debtor defaults, and Creditor has to choose between
repossession or not, the repossession move is suboptimal (repossession costs exceed
resale costs by definition). Given that repossession is not Creditor's best move at the
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the threat credible is by contracting with a third party. For instance,
Creditor may arrange for a debt collector or "repo man" to earn a fee
for each repossession opportunity. 7' Alternatively, Creditor can estab-
lish a reputation for credibility by precommitting to a rule that repos-
session will follow default regardless of the cost in individual cases.
The credibility of the commitment is thus enhanced by Debtor's belief
that Creditor is willing to maintain a reputation for consistency that will
pay off ultimately in reducing the risk of default in subsequent transac-
tions with other debtors.
The parties must be careful to define Creditor's commitment pre-
cisely, both in specifying exactly when the default triggers a response
and the precise nature of the response. Creditor is motivated to de-
velop a reputation for credibility at least cost to itself. Debtor, on the
other hand, needs to recognize the threat so as to take precautions
against default. Thus, the commitment to repossess should be clear
and predictable and linked only to visible acts of misbehavior by
Debtor. This does not present much of a problem in the Debtor-Credi-
tor interaction when the only cause of default is assumed to be misbe-
havior by Debtor. But in real-world situations, a creditor must confront
the possibility of default caused by purely exogenous factors, such as
loss of employment. Because a repossession for reasons other than
Debtor's misbehavior is costly to Creditor and does not enhance future
performance by other debtors, Creditor would prefer to limit its threat
to those defaults caused by Debtor's improvidence.
72
Furthermore, it would be helpful if Creditor could divide the re-
possession threat into a sequence of discrete steps-such as telephone
calls and letters-attaching to a s'eries of ancillary symptoms of defec-
tion, each act escalating incrementally. The sequence of threatened
postdefault stage, the ex ante pledge to repossess may not be credible. Thus, the hostage
will not perform its function: Debtor will have an incentive to misbehave because she
believes that she can forestall repossession later on. In the context of the Debtor-Credi-
tor interaction, therefore, it is important for Creditor to maintain the credibility of its
commitment so that its entire collection experience will improve. While this analysis
confirms that the commitment must be credible, it does not follow that Creditor must
foreclose in every case. Rather, Creditor is motivated to set an optimal level of reposses-
sion, one that minimizes total enforcement costs. Optimal enforcement would require a
frequency of repossession that minimizes the sum of the direct costs of enforcement
(repossession) and the indirect costs (the increase in the risk of subsequent defaults
attributable to reduced credibility).
71. In order for the use of a repo man to be a credible precommitment by Creditor,
the repo man has to be in a position to determine, without the aid of Creditor, that
Debtor has defaulted. Otherwise, Creditor can still cheat by failing to tell the repo man
of the default. Thus, if Creditor simply refers defaults to the repo man, Creditor still
retains discretion and the commitment may not be credible.
72. Creditor may not always be able to sort defaults attributable to endogenous
risks from those caused by exogenous risks. Nevertheless, the motivation to limit the
threat may explain the common practice of renegotiation and consolidation of delin-
quent accounts. See infra text pp. 751-52.
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acts attached to initial signals of misbehavior enables Creditor to
demonstrate, by taking a few initial steps, that further transgressions
will be followed by the ultimate step of repossession.
73
The importance to Creditor of precommitting to an unambiguous
rule of behavior is illustrated by a further problem: self-help remedies
are ineffectual unless they can be communicated to the other party. In
the case of the Debtor-Creditor interaction, the threat to repossess
upon default can, of course, be communicated clearly to Debtor in the
credit contract. But it is unlikely that a standard form contract term will
also effectively communicate Creditor's resolve. This can be done best
by developing a reputation as one who carries out the threatened act.
The reputation is effective because it embodies evidence that a commit-
ment to the threatened act has been made.
2. Postdefault Bargaining: The Effects of Self-Enforcing Remedies.
a. A Model of the Postdefault Bargain. - The nature of the bargaining
environment changes dramatically when the debtor defaults on the re-
payment obligation. Assume in the Debtor-Creditor interaction that
the agreement fails to deter the overconsumption of credit, and Debtor
subsequently defaults on the payment obligation. Now the parties en-
counter a postdefault bargaining opportunity in which they both have an
interest in undoing the reciprocal commitments. After all, the purpose
of the threat is gone, and its deterrence value (at least for this transac-
tion) is zero. This dilemma begins to look like a bargaining stalemate-
a situation in which both parties are attached to incompatible positions.
If there is a possibility of undoing the commitments (that is, foregoing
repossession and leaving the pledged assets in Debtor's control), both
have an interest in doing so.
The parties, however, may not have any common interest in how to
retract the commitments. Creditor must maintain the credibility of the
repossession threat in order to motivate cooperative behavior by other
debtors. While maintaining credibility is important, it does not follow
that Creditor must foreclose in every case. Rather, Creditor is moti-
vated to adopt a variable strategy, choosing between repossession and
settlement in particular contexts. This strategy enables Creditor to bal-
ance the direct costs of repossession against anticipated losses in credi-
bility. Since repossession is costly to Creditor, Debtor is motivated to
seek a compensatory concession in order to forego her right to declare
bankruptcy. Because neither party is willing to sacrifice its postdefault
position without compensation, it is entirely possible that the parties
may be unable to collaborate in undoing the self-enforcement appara-
tus. Thus, the dynamics of the postdefault environment are much more
like a zero-sum game than the cooperative opportunity that marked the
initial negotiations. Strictly speaking, a zero-sum game is the limiting
case of pure conflict, in which promises and commitments are not em-
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ployed at all. Instead, the rational strategies of the two players are to
reveal as little about oneself to the other as possible.
In Figure 2, the postdefault relationship between Creditor and
Debtor is depicted by two interactions (curves A-A and B-B1 ), with
Creditor's gains measured vertically and Debtor's horizontally. Dispute
A represents a pure conflict situation (or zero-sum game) in which each
party is aware of its own choices and has no ability to influence the
other's choices. Each party has two options. Creditor can choose C
(settlement) or c (repossession and resale). Similarly, Debtor can
choose between D (settlement) and d (strategic delay or "stone-
walling").
Under the conditions specified in Figure 2, dispute A has a
minimax solution--one in which each party minimizes its maximum risk
of loss at the impasse point cd (coercive repossession). Repossession
(c) is the only rational strategy for Creditor. Creditor knows Debtor
will elect to stonewall (d) in all cases. Regardless of what Creditor de-
cides to do, the option of stonewalling (d) is better for Debtor than
settlement (D). Thus, Creditor's alternative choice of settlement (C)
will lead inevitably to Cd (the most costly solution for Creditor). Under
these conditions, the parties will reach an impasse at cd because neither
can entice the other to agree to anything better. No collaboration is
possible, and no commitments or promises can be made.
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74. The parties will not necessarily choose the minimax solution in all cases. Parties
who are risk averse will always prefer a minimax strategy, but if the parties are risk neu-
tral, they will prefer instead a strategy that maximizes their expected monetary returns.
Maximizing expected utility may require deviation from the minimax point. In any case,
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Dispute B represents the same set of choices made under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Each party is aware of the consequences of its own
choices but uncertain of which option the other will choose. If the par-
ties expend costs, represented by the shaded area in Figure 2, each one
can discover what the other will do through bluffs, feints and other
costly maneuvers.75 In dispute B, the parties also will reach an impasse
at point cd. The principal difference between the two disputes is that
the parties will reach the outcome in dispute B only after they expend
costs in discovering the true state of affairs. If each party had known
the truth about the other, they could have avoided the punishing ma-
neuvers and agreed to share the resulting gains. But ignorance of the
other's position does not change the ordering of the parties' choices.
Nor, given the relationship among the various choices, will it alter the
dominant resolution, which in this case is coercive repossession at cd.
The options may be arrayed quite differently in subsequent trans-
actions. For example, fulfilling the repossession pledge will enhance
Creditor's reputation for credibility and may make settlement a pre-
ferred choice thereafter. The problem of maintaining credibility always
will have an important effect on the Creditor's choice between settle-
ment (C) and repossession (c). Credibility further influences Creditbr's
motivations even when repossession and resale are the dominant
choice. The repossession option is motivated, at least in part, by a de-
sire to maintain a reputation for firmness. Thus, Creditor's normal in-
centives to maximize the proceeds of any resale are somewhat skewed.
Uncollectible deficiencies are not necessarily a sunk cost for Creditor to
the extent that they can be charged off as advertising Creditor's resolve
in subsequent transactions. 76 But, in any case, these uncertainties will
affect only the magnitude of the gains or losses each party obtains from
choosing its best response. Information asymmetries will not alter the
structure of the postdefault bargain. And it is this structure, the rela-
tionship among the various choices, that will determine the outcome.
b. The Effects of Self-Enforcing Terms. - How, then, do self-enforcing
remedies effect the outcome of these postdefault negotiations? Figure
2 shows that the bargaining costs of default are a product of each
the central thesis of the model remains unimpaired: jf the parties cannot solve their
information problems, they will be at disagreement points that are suboptimal.
75. The curve B-B, is represented as concave to the origin in order to reflect the
intuition that the more parties attempt to learn about each other through costly maneu-
vering, the closer they approach coercive repossession at cd. Thus, if either party adopts
an extreme position (stonewalling by Debtor or immediate repossession by Creditor)
while the other is conciliatory, the total expenditure on bargaining costs will be reduced
although the outcome will be disfavored by one party or the other.
76. This point partially supports the intuition of many observers that secured credi-
tors do not systematically maximize the proceeds of a resale. The model presented here
does not suggest that creditors systematicallyfail to maximize. But it does suggest that
their resale decisions are subject to mixed motives. The normative implications of this
analysis are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
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party's uncertainty as to which option the other will choose. Thus, the
choice among particular remedies, such as that between self-help re-
possession and postjudgment execution, should have no appreciable
effect on the postdefault bargaining costs. As long as each party is un-
aware of the other's choices, each will engage in costly maneuvers
designed to learn more about the position of the other. For instance, in
the parlance of the consumer credit transaction, Creditor will expend
substantial costs in discovering whether Debtor is a "can't pay" or a
"won't pay." 77 Since this and similar facts are not easily communi-
cated, each party needs to obtain evidence of the other's choices as re-
vealed in her actions. Furthermore, in the Debtor-Creditor interaction,
these facts are likely to be very difficult to discover. The determination
of whether Debtor is a "can't pay," for example, will often turn on the
ability of Creditor to coerce Debtor to convert funds from other debt
obligations to satisfy Creditor's claim. Ultimately, of course, Creditor's
ability to coerce a greater share of a fixed pool of assets can be trumped
by Debtor's declaration of bankruptcy.
Thus, once Debtor defaults, the effects of self-enforcing remedies
will be largely, if not exclusively, distributional. If Creditor is unable to
bargain for the most effective remedial options, its power to force an
advantageous resolution will be diminished since it must turn to more
costly substitutes. Restricting Creditor's postdefault options also in-
creases the cost of learning about the relative values of the choices
available to Debtor. All things being equal, cost increases will reduce
Creditor's power to claim a larger share of Debtor's assets.78
It is important to emphasize that the regulation of self-enforcing
remedies will not eliminate the coercion inherent in postdefault bar-
gaining. Each party continues to have the power as well as the incen-
tive to threaten strategic moves in order to obtain valuable information
77. Empirical data, although incomplete, indicate that creditors regard the exercise
of coercive remedies as the least efficient method of acquiring information concerning
the debtor's options. The postdefault creditor usually proceeds through a series of ex-
trajudicial "contacts," contractual rewrites, consolidations and extensions. As the delin-
quency continues, these contacts become more insistent and personalized, reflecting the
creditor's motivation both to maintain the credibility of the ultimate threat of reposses-
sion, wage assignment or the like and to renegotiate delinquency in cases where default
is involuntary. A 1971 survey by the Consumer Bankers Association indicated that prior
to any repossession on delinquent accounts in automobile credit sales, there were an
average of 3.6 extensions or rewrites, 10.3 delinquency notices, 12.2 telephone calls and
7.9 personal contacts. See Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic
Analysis, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 82, 94 & n.29 (1973) (citing Consumer Bankers Association,
Repossession Survey for the Year 1971); see also 2 D. Caplovitz, Debtors in Default 12-
60 to 12-68 (1971) (discussing relationship between reasons for default and resumption
of payments); Johnson, supra, at 85-88, 90-94 (cost-benefit analysis of actions taken
prior to repossession and of repossession itself).
78. This result stems, in part, from the fact that strategic delay is one of Debtor's
principal options. The longer it takes for Creditor to learn about Debtor's options, the
greater Debtor's leverage from delay.
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about the other's choices. Even without self-enforcing remedies, Cred-
itor will still use coercion (threatening to notify employers or making
harassing telephone calls) in order to learn more about Debtor's op-
tions. And, of course, Debtor has an interest in using similar strategies
to test Creditor's resolve. The coercion that is commonly observed
once default occurs is a structural component of the relationship itself.
Regulation will merely motivate the search for substitutes. The alterna-
tives may be more costly or less effective, but they will inevitably be
rooted in the same behaviors.
This point can be made more clearly by reconceptualizing dispute
B in Figure 2 as a continuum of choices, with the minimax solution cd
falling along a fairly wide range of the curve B-B 1. The absence of a
clear choice point is a more realistic approximation of the real-world
interactions between the parties. A continuum of choices emphasizes
the potential gains to each party from coercing adjustment within the
range of solution cd. This distributional effect is illustrated in Figure 2
by point cd*, which represents the minimax solution if Creditor must
use a substitute method of coercion. 79 Furthermore, visualizing the in-
teractions as a continuum of choices suggests why the parties may often
reach an impasse. The continuous range of choices deprives the parties
of any "focal point" solution. No key characteristic of the relationship
distinguishes it qualitatively from the surrounding alternatives. The
lack of any focal point to the postdefault bargaining is one of the most
important dynamic considerations in reducing the prospects for
settlement.8 0
3. Summary. - The language of bargaining theory tends to cast the
actions of the parties in starkly cool-headed and calculating terms. The
cooperative bargaining model does not, however, require one to be-
lieve that debtors and creditors actually engage in negotiations that
have this level of calculation. In real-world interactions, many of the
bargaining moves on both sides will be reflexive, impulsive and intui-
tive. It is important, nevertheless, to appreciate the very strong motiva-
tions facing both Debtor and Creditor to devise a regulatory system to
control conflicts of interest that otherwise threaten the viability of the
agreement itself. Self-enforcing remedies function as reciprocal com-
mitments that compensate for deficiencies in legal enforcement. This
exchange of economic hostages creates mutual vulnerabilities. Debtor
79. Even with the use of repossession or wage assignments, Creditor's power to
extort a larger settlement is limited by Debtor's option to discharge the debt in bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy is costly to Debtor, however, since it involves both reputational
losses as well as the loss of nonexempt assets that must be turned over to the bankruptcy
trustee. Hence, the range cd to cd* is fixed by the inherent structure of the relationship.
80. Thomas Schelling was the first to demonstrate the intrinsic magnetism of par-
ticular outcomes, especially those that enjoy prominence, uniqueness or some rationale
that makes them qualitatively different from the continuum of possible alternatives. See




risks the loss of idiosyncratic value, while Creditor risks the loss of rep-
utation (and consequent loss of revenue).
If Debtor defaults, the parties no longer face opportunities for mu-
tual gains. The postdefault relationship is essentially a zero-sum game,
in which any gains to one will be matched by offsetting losses to the
other. Creditor is motivated by an optimizing strategy-choosing be-
tween repossession and renegotiation depending on the costs of each
choice and the reasons for default. Debtor's choices, in turn, depend
on whether it is optimal for Creditor to repossess or renegotiate in this
instance. Thus, each party will use any available strategic leverage to
reduce its uncertainty about the other's choices. Without any opportu-
nity for mutually beneficial agreement, Creditor's access to coercive re-
medial options necessarily will have only a distributional effect. At this
stage, restricting creditor remedies will advantage Debtor at the ex-
pense of Creditor.
II. TESTING THE MODEL: THE DYNAMICS OF THE
CONSUMER CREDIT RELATIONSHIP
My purpose thus far in developing the cooperative bargaining
model with some care has been to isolate certain structural elements
that characterize and delimit the consumer credit transaction. As such,
the question is not whether the model approximates reality, but
whether it tells us something about reality that is useful to know. But
even this more modest claim is not uncontroversial. In order to assess
whether the model has utility as a heuristic device, two further ques-
tions must be resolved. First, to what extent does the available evi-
dence of the nature of consumer credit transactions confirm the basic
premises of the cooperative bargaining model? Second, to what extent
is the model useful once its rather strong assumptions are explicitly
relaxed?
A. Evaluating the Data
1. The Benign Function of Self-Enforcing Remedies. - The principal test
for the cooperative bargaining conceptualization lies in its ability to
predict patterns of interaction that are actually observed in consumer
credit relationships. The evidence to test the validity of the hypothesis
is sketchy at best. Nevertheless, some systematic efforts have been
made to explore both the conditions underlying default and the parties'
responses to these conditions. There are two major studies of the
causes of consumer default, one by the National Commission on
Consumer Finance (NCCF)8' and the other by sociologist David
Caplovitz.8 2 Caplovitz surveyed a random population of consumer
81. V National Commission on Consumer Finance, Technical Studies (1973) [here-
inafter NCCF].
82. D. Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble: A Study of Debtors in Default (1974).
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debtors, whereas the NCCF relied on survey data from creditors.
Both studies suggest that consumer default derives from two prin-
cipal sources: endogenous events, such as overextension, marital insta-
bility and irresponsibility, and exogenous events, such as loss of income
or unemployment. Caplovitz found that although loss of income was
the single most prevalent cause of default (43%), the debtor's own im-
providence or other endogenous risks triggered default a substantial
amount of the time (36%).83 Furthermore, debtors listed endogenous
factors as the secondary reason for default 45 percent of the time.8 4 In
adopting its credit practices rule, the FTC focused on the frequent in-
voluntariness of the immediate causes of default and thus concluded
that default was usually inevitable and unavoidable.85 But, to the con-
trary, the data provide powerful indirect. evidence of the existence of
the sorts of conflicts that will motivate the parties to devise a scheme of
self-enforcing remedies. Furthermore, the complicating factor of invol-
untary default helps to explain the evidence that creditors pursue a va-
riable strategy in postdefault encounters, renegotiating some defaults
and enforcing remedial options in others.
86
The anecdotal evidence provided by creditors and their industry
representatives strongly confirms the conception of self-enforcing rem-
edies as a substitute for deficiencies in legal enforcement. Consider,
for instance, the testimony of one witness who appeared in opposition
to the proposed FTC rule. The testimony demonstrates both the psy-
chological leverage that security provides to creditors and the impor-
tance of publicly demonstrating resolve in the face of refusals to pay.
Q. "Did you ever have to junk it?" [The debtor's repossessed
goods.]
A. "Yes!"
83. Id. at 53. Caplovitz categorized these events as voluntary overextension (13%),
involuntary overextension (5%6), marital instability (6%b), debtor's third parties (8%) and
debtor irresponsibility (4%). Id. In the terms used in this paper, these defaults resulted
(at least in part) from contingencies over which the debtors had some control. In turn,
this suggests that the debtors did not take the creditors' interests fully into account when
making postcredit financial decisions. Loss of income was listed as causing default in
43% of the cases, creditor misbehavior in 14%o and miscellaneous misunderstandings in
7%. Id.
The NCCF study found unemployment ranked as the most important cause of de-
fault by all classes of creditors. Overextension was found to be the second most impor-
tant cause by banks and finance companies and the third most important cause by
retailers. See NCCF, supra note 81, at 9.
84. D. Caplovitz, supra note 82, at 53.
85. FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7747-48.
86. The FTC found that creditors with a blanket security interest in household
goods repossessed in some cases and renegotiated in others. See id. at 7763. There
may be two complementary explanations for this response. First, the cooperative model
would predict that creditors would be motivated to renegotiate or excuse default ex post
whenever its causes were involuntary. Second, even in cases of default caused by over-
extension, the model predicts that creditors would select an "optimal" level of enforce-
ment that balanced repossession costs against lost credibility.
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Q. "You have to junk some of it?"
A. "Yes, and do you know why, are you interested?"
Q. "Certainly."
A. "Let me pose this as a hypothetical case-it is not hypo-
thetical, it is actual. You have a number of families in one
area who will be borrowing from you. If this fellow contin-
ues to go down the drain and continues to ignore his obli-
gation and you try everything in the world to get him to
pay and he is laughing at you and is saying - .
Q "You want to make an example of him for other people?"
A. "Not necessarily an example. But if you don't you are go-
ing to charge* off the whole block."87
Based on this testimony and other supporting evidence, the FTC
found that despite the limited economic value of household goods,
creditors rely on the threat of repossession to encourage debtors to
continue to work toward repayment.88 Indeed, the predefault leverage
created by idiosyncratic value was found to be a primary motivating
factor underlying the common use of blanket security interests. Credi-
tors reported that borrowers were much better disciplined if they
pledged their household goods.8 9 The value of these self-enforcing de-
vices is confirmed by evidence suggesting that alternative enforcement
through judicial processes is inadequate. Creditors pursue a deficiency
judgment only infrequently and on average recover no more than five
to fifteen percent of the outstanding debt.90
The inference that self-enforcing terms reinforce a commitment to
cooperate is supported by additional evidence. Creditors routinely de-
compose the threat of enforcement into a series of discrete steps, each
action escalating incrementally.91 Furthermore, the data show that es-
calating threats to repossess are used by creditors to "compel" debtors
to agree to refinance overdue obligations. The FTC found this psycho-
logical and economic leverage troubling because it was against the
87. Id. at 7763 n.36 (quoting Carl Waxman, North Carolina Consumer Finance As-
sociation). "The maintenance of credibility was offered as a reason for repossession by
other witnesses." Id. (citing Michael Burns, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis).
88. Id. at 7763.
89. See, e.g., id. at 7765 n.69 (citing Alan Susman, West Virginia State Senate,
Owner of a Small Loan Company; George Prentiss, Citizens Budget Co.); see also id. at
7763 & n.33 (quoting Helmut Schmidt, Vice-Chairman of Transamerica Financial Cor-
poration) ("'There are two very, very important values to the furniture. One is the
replacement value, the other is psychological, that enhances the sentimental value in
heirlooms being provided .... '). The psychological loss was mentioned "over and
over again in the Commission proceedings." Id. at 7763. The industry maintained that
blanket security interests were valuable devices because "'[this is the edge that makes
the debtor pay.'" Id. at 7765 & n.68 (quoting James White, Counsel of State Credit
Institutes).
90. Id. at 7783.




debtor's economic interest in some cases 92 (although not necessarily
inconsistent with the ex ante contractual objectives of both parties). Put-
ting aside for the moment the understandable distaste for postdefault
coercion, however, this evidence is entirely consistent with the predic-
tions of the cooperative model. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
the coercive postdefault behavior is not linked to the particular self-
enforcing remedy, but to the creditor's motivation to discover the
causes of delinquency and, if possible, to forestall default.9 3
The specialization of the market for personal loans provides fur-
ther support for the claim that self-enforcing remedies encourage pre-
cautionary behavior by debtors. The data show significant variation in
the remedial terms offered by particular creditors. Prior to the FTC
rule, self-enforcing remedies were much more prevalent in the loan
contracts offered by finance companies than in those offered by other
creditors making consumer loans.9 4 Furthermore, the data rebut any
inference that this specialization reflects a disproportionate concentra-
tion of low-income, high-risk consumers among the customers of fi-
nance companies. Rather, the evidence shows a substantial overlap in
the borrower characteristics of personal loan customers of banks and
finance companies. 95 Thus, it is plausible to infer that most consumer
debtors were able to choose between lower-cost credit providers who
used self-enforcing remedies and higher-cost credit providers who did
not.
In sum, the available data lend support to four basic structural
claims of the cooperative model. First, conflicts of interest inherent in
the "lend first, pay later" character of consumer credit will, unless re-
strained, threaten the successful performance of the contract. Second,
self-enforcing creditor remedies function, at least in part, as a means of
reducing anticipated conflicts and encouraging the debtor to consider
both parties' interests when making subsequent financial decisions.
Third, these self-enforcing terms are peculiarly useful because the al-
ternative of legal enforcement is generally unavailable and, if pursued,
will return only an insignificant portion of the remaining obligation.
Fourth, postdefault coercion is largely a product of a sorting problem.
Creditors are motivated to determine whether default is caused by ex-
ogenous factors (can't pay) or endogenous risks (won't pay).
96
92. Id. at 7764-65.
93. See, e.g., id. at 7764-66; supra note 77.
94. "Results of a survey of over 10,000 current accounts of finance companies re-
vealed clauses authorizing [household-goods] security interests in 76% of precomputed
loan contracts." FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7762 n.12.
95. See Boczar, Competition Between Banks and Finance Companies: A Cross Sec-
tion Study of Personal Loan Debtors, 33 J. Fin. 245, 253-54 (1978).
96. If the debtor's improvidence causes the default, the creditor has an incentive to
repossess in order to maintain its reputation for credibility. On the other hand, credi-
tors prefer to renegotiate defaults caused by factors beyond the debtor's control.
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2. The Risk of Creditor Misbehavior. - The model suggests that the
risk of creditor misbehavior is heightened whenever the debtor offers
an economic hostage that is independently valuable to the creditor.
97
Here the data offer supporting evidence as well. The claims of creditor
fraud, induced breach and rush to repossession are almost exclusively
linked to creditors with security interests in readily marketable con-
sumer durables, such as automobiles.98 The FTC concluded that re-
stricting deficiency judgments on automobile repossessions "would
reduce the value of the collateral to creditors," and thus, regulation
would raise credit costs.9 9 While this may be so, the claims of fraud and
induced breach should be taken more seriously in these cases precisely
because the economic hostage has independent value to the creditor.
Furthermore, even here the creditor's motivations in reselling repos-
sessed goods may not always lead to maximizing resale proceeds. To
the extent that repossession despite large deficiencies advertises its re-
solve, the creditor can charge the deficiences off against subsequently
successful transactions.
On the other hand, the data suggest that creditors repossess far
less frequently in the case of blanket security interests in household
goods. 10 0 Indeed, in the case of blanket security interests, wage assign-
ments and waivers of exempt assets, there is virtually no evidence of
"excessive enforcement" or induced breach. Rather, as one might pre-
dict, the objections to these terms rest on the coercive effects of the
leverage they provide in postdefault encounters.10 1 Once again, the
FTC concluded from this that the right to repossess household goods
or exempt assets, such as heirlooms, or to claim a portion of future
earnings caused consumer injury with little corresponding benefits to
creditors. 10 2 But this evidence is entirely consistent with a cooperative
bargaining approach. The value of the self-enforcing term is entirely
prospective. If the focus is exclusively on the debtors who default, one
would predict that the mutual incentives to undo the commitment
97. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Shuchman, supra note 17; White, supra note 17; Note, Business as
Usual, supra note 17, at 516-21.
99. FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7784.
100. Id. at 7763. This evidence is consistent with the prediction that creditors pur-
sue an optimizing strategy in enforcing coercive remedies upon default. While reposses-
sion or other enforcement is seen as necessary to maintaining credibility, the costs of
repossession deter creditors from a policy of universal enforcement. As the model
predicts, creditors seek to convince debtors that repossession will be swift and sure, but
then are reluctant to repossess when default occurs. One method of accomplishing this
strategy is to renegotiate-and thus excuse default-in appropriate cases.
101. "Because of its low economic value, exempt property is rarely seized. Rather
the common inclusion of waivers of exemption clauses suggests their primary use as in
terrorem collection devices." Id. at 7769.
102. Id. at 7757-59 (wage assignments); id. at 7762-63 (household goods repos-
session); id. at 7769-70 (waivers of exemption).
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would reduce the rate of repossession and increase the incidence of
coercive or in terrorem actions by creditors.
The single-minded focus on those consumers who default deprives
us of the critical evidence that would illuminate more fully the con-
sumer-debtor relationship. What we do not know, except by inference,
is the social value of self-enforcing remedies in encouraging optimal
precautionary behavior by debtors who pay. The evidence must, there-
fore, be regarded as inconclusive on the central claim that creditor rem-
edies improve contractual performance in the overwhelming majority
of cases in which no default occurs. Given that uncertainty, the pre-
scriptive value of the model rests on its power once all assumptions are
explicitly relaxed.
B. Relaxing the Assumptions of the Model
The bargaining model developed above was based on certain clari-
fying assumptions. In particular, it assumed that each player could
evaluate rationally the choices available to her and make certain strate-
gic moves designed to maximize her own interests. Furthermore, it as-
sumed that controlling endogenous risks-in particular the risks of
creditor and debtor misbehavior-was the only impediment to success-
ful performance of the contract. Finally, it assumed that the parties
could exchange perfectly calibrated economic hostages to overcome
the deficits in legal enforcement of credit promises. A critical question,
then, is whether the ex ante perspective is still useful when these as-
sumptions are relaxed and the model is applied in a more realistic
setting.
1. Rational Choice. - Bargaining theory is premised on an abstract
model of rational choice. Highly idealized actors operate in a highly
idealized setting, making highly idealized choices. Each actor seeks to
maximize his expected utility. Nevertheless, in a bargaining model, ra-
tionality implies very little beyond a certain consistency of choice: if I
prefer A to B and B to C, then I prefer A to C.103
Remember that the purpose of the model is not to describe either
the actual behavior or the thought processes of the parties to consumer
credit transactions. The conceptualization of the relationship in terms
of carefully calibrated commitments and promises might seem to sug-
gest that parties to this transaction engage in coolly rational strategic
analysis both before and after default. This is not the case. Consumer
debtors do not dicker for particular credit terms. On the other hand,
available data suggest that most consumer debtors do have a choice
between credit contracts with self-enforcing terms and contracts with-
out such terms.' 0 4 This more realistic picture of consumer choice does
103. See H. Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social
Choice 6-11 (1982).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
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not undermine the value of the model so long as we assume that indi-
vidual behavior is not random and that the individual is responsive to
self-interest.
To be sure, the possibility that consumer debtors may be ignorant
of their options or of creditors' likely responses, act impulsively or err
systematically in making inductive inferences raises legitimate ques-
tions for policymakers. 105 The strategies or heuristics used by individ-
uals to make judgments about uncertain events are subject to bias and
often deviate from the ideals of inference and probability assess-
ment.' 0 6 Nonetheless, these cognitive heuristics are ingrained in indi-
vidual behavior precisely because they are so useful.' 0 7 Thus, the
evidence that individual judgment is flawed by cognitive errors is not
inconsistent with the assumption that individual behavior is purposive.
In turn, the evidence of ingrained problem-solving techniques, leading
people to act purposefully, supports the inference that individual be-
havior may generally approximate the cooperative model even though
individual judgments may be flawed by cognitive errors.108 In sum, this
highly artificial scheme turns out to be a powerful aid to understanding
what happens in the real world, where all of its very special assumptions
are at best only crude oversimplifications.
2. Involuntary Default. - A more difficult problem concerns the
simplifying assumption that the performance of credit contracts is only
influenced by endogenous risks (the risks of misbehavior). Realisti-
cally, the parties must also consider the possibility of nonperformance
owing to wholly exogenous factors such as involuntary loss of employ-
ment. It is one thing to exchange an economic hostage in order to
protect oneself from weak will or one's own improvident future
choices. This form of precommitment is a common choice-manage-
ment technique.' 0 9 But it is quite another matter to enforce such a
commitment when the default is caused by factors wholly beyond the
debtor's control.
There are two possible responses to the problem of involuntary
default. First, allocating, exogenous risks of nonperformance to the
party who bears the endogenous risks is a rational risk-distribution
105. The evidence of cognitive and volitional "error" is central to the normative
claim that regulation of self-enforcing remedies is justified on efficiency or paternalistic
grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 119-33 & 159-75.
106. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
107. See D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases 3-4 (1982).
108. See generally Mace & Kratochwill, Self-Monitoring, in Handbook of Behavior
Therapy in Education (1988) (reviewing clinical and experimental evidence of self-moni-
toring behavior in which individuals follow purposive, self-generated strategies of be-
havioral adjustment in order to realize desired goals).
109. See Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on
the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 329, 342-47 (1986).
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strategy when it is difficult to distinguish legitimate claims of excuse
from manufactured ones. Once an excuse category is recognized, the
debtor has an incentive to claim excuse for all defaults, even those at-
tributable to the debtor's improvidence. Since dispute resolution is
both costly and imprecise, debtors may be able systematically to impose
default costs on creditors. One method of resolving this problem,
therefore, is to narrow (or eliminate) the circumstances in which excuse
for nonperformance will be recognized. 110 Alternatively, creditors can
excuse some defaults in appropriate cases without announcing ex ante
that they will do so.111 In theory, debtors will be paid a premium in
reduced interest rates in exchange for assuming these additional bur-
dens. The gains that result from a more efficient risk-distribution
scheme will be shared prospectively by debtors and creditors.
There is an alternative response to the problem of involuntary de-
fault. If consumer debtors are risk averse, they will benefit from an
implied "force majeure" provision, 12 a clause exempting debtors from
responsibility for those exogenous risks they cannot control. Creditors,
in turn, will agree to such a term, provided the interest rate can be
adjusted to compensate for the prepaid default insurance. Assuming
the grounds for excuse can be specified accurately, this contract will be
optimal for both creditors and debtors so long as creditors can pool the
risk.
The risk-bearing choices for exogenous risks will turn on which of
these alternative scenarios is the more plausible empirically. But, in
either case, the question of assigning the burden of events beyond
either parties' control relates solely to excuses for breach of contract
and not to the effects of particular creditor remedies. Even if self-en-
forcing terms were entirely prohibited, the debtor's default owing to
circumstances beyond his control would not, under the current legal
regime, give the debtor an excuse for nonpayment. Presumably, the
creditor would remain free to pursue collection through the normal
state-enforcement mechanisms. In short, however one reacts to the
traditional reluctance of the common law of contracts to grant excuse
for nonperformance, the issue is only tangentially relevant to the choice
of self-enforcing terms.
3. Proportionality: Debtor Ignorance and Excessive Commitments. - A co-
operative bargaining model assumes that Creditor and Debtor can de-
sign a pattern of reciprocal commitments that effectively constrains the
110. This approach best describes the reluctance of courts deciding commercial
impracticability cases to grant excuse for nonperformance despite the apparent invita-
tion to do so in the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1981). For a
discussion of the relationship between judicial attitudes and the complexity of the issues
in excuse cases, see A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 12, at 415-18, 427-28, 449-57.
111. This strategy seems to be widely used by creditors. See supra note 77.
112. "Force majeure" excuses nonperformance attributable to any "circumstances
independent of the will of man, and which it is not in his power to control." Lebeaupin
v. Richard Crispin & Co. [1920] 2 K.B. 714, 719; see U.C.C. § 2-615 (1981).
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debtor without unduly tempting the creditor. The metaphor of the
puny prince is specifically intended to convey this key relation.113 In
reality, however, the instruments available to the parties are inexact and
potentially defective. Thus, one might fear either that debtors are una-
ware of coercive remedies and thus that the commitments are insuffi-
cient to encourage truly cooperative behavior, or that the commitments
are excessive-too enticing for creditors or severe for debtors.
The possibility that debtors may be systematically unaware of
either the presence or the effects of self-enforcing remedies seems
quite remote. The precommitment argument does not depend on any
details of the obligation being understood. It is enough if the debtor
understands that she may lose her furniture or part of her wages if she
defaults. Creditor actions against property or wages are salient facts,
easily associated with default." 4 Furthermore, unlike the systematic in-
formation asymmetries that plague warranty disclaimers and other
terms in standard form contracts, the creditor has an interest in pub-
licizing the consequences of default. Such announcements reinforce a
reputation for credibility and promote the creditor's interest in devel-
oping a "brand name."' 115
The problem of excessive commitments raises two separate con-
cerns, each of which might form the basis for regulating particular
terms in credit contracts. First, certain commitments simply may be too
enticing for creditors, producing an unacceptably high risk of creditor
misbehavior. The practice of pyramiding late charges provides a good
illustration of such a potentially defective remedy.' 1 6 Pyramiding re-
sults from the assessment of multiple delinquent charges for a single
late payment. Unless subsequent payments include the initial late
charge, they, too, will be short and an additional delinquency charge
will be assessed. The benign explanation for pyramiding is that the
penalty reinforces a commitment to prompt payment of each install-
ment. The threat of a continuing late charge is a means of decompos-
ing the larger threat (repossession) into smaller steps attached to the
ancillary actions that lead to default. Nevertheless, the risk of exploita-
tion by creditors seems significantly higher here than with other self-
enforcing terms. Pyramiding is based on an accounting method, not on
a contract term. Thus, it is often unknown to consumers and could not
113. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
114. It is likely, indeed inevitable, that individual debtors will be unaware of the
presence and effects of self-enforcing terms. This possibility, however, merely supports
an argument for reducing ex ante information deficits, not for prohibiting the remedies
altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 145-47.
115. The motivation of creditors to differentiate their "product" is revealed in the
evidence that the market for installment credit is highly specialized. Small loan and
commercial finance companies have used self-enforcing remedies extensively. On the
other hand, such terms appear much less frequently in the credit contracts of commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions. See FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7762.
116. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.4 (1988), prohibits pyramiding.
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serve as a useful deterrent to late payments. On the other hand, the
practice puts the debtor continuously in default and thus at risk of an
induced breach even though all subsequent payments have been
current.
The use of confession of judgment clauses may be similarly con-
demned. On its face, a confession of judgment simply transforms the
state-enforcement system into a self-enforcing remedy. Since the rem-
edy is only as good as the debtor's continuing solvency, it could operate
as a "puny prince" hostage. But the opportunity to evade contractual
risks such as warranty liability or interest rate shifts may be too tempt-
ing for creditors. The heightened risk of fraud or induced breach may
thus require a prophylactic rule prohibiting the activity or the term
altogether.
The risk of creditor misbehavior should not be overstated, how-
ever. Market forces will restrain many creditors from frivolous or erro-
neous enforcement against blameless debtors. The creditor's
reputation is a valuable asset, one that contributes to the future success
of the enterprise. The incentive to maintain credibility and good will
reduces the risk of repossession whenever the debtor is not "at fault" in
the ways described above.
The risk of excessively severe commitments is a further difficulty
with the exchange of economic hostages in the real world. Consider
the possibility that consumer debtors may systematically overcommit
and agree to overly harsh sanctions upon default. The objection to ex-
treme commitments-such as self-enslavement or forms of physical co-
ercion-stems from the belief that less severe ways of bonding future
promises are available and will be equally effective. Thus, a blanket
prohibition of excessive commitments is simply a recognition that such
bargains are almost always irrational.
In short, the possibility that debtors may overcommit justifies both
the prohibition on extreme penalties and the tolerance of moderate
ones. To be sure, the possibility of error in defining commitments and
threats makes the real-world choices more difficult for policymakers.
But the central theme remains unimpaired: self-enforcing remedies
must be assessed in terms of their positive as well as their negative ef-
fects. At least in theory, both parties benefit from the inclusion of cred-
itor remedies that have the potential to destroy value if the debtor
should default. The remaining question is whether these potential ben-
efits are overridden by legitimate concerns that justify current regula-
tion even at the risk of sacrificing these gains.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: A NEW LOOK
AT THE CASE FOR REGULATION
The preceding analysis argues for a fundamental reconceptualiza-
tion of the nature and function of self-enforcing creditor remedies.
This ex ante perspective recasts the several arguments for regulation. A
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prescriptive assessment of self-enforcing remedies begins with the
norm of expanded choice. The expanded-choice postulate maintains
that implied contract terms (including the standard remedies for breach
of contract) are justifiable because they function to expand contractors'
choices-providing standardized and widely suitable preformulated
terms, thus eliminating the cost (and error) of negotiating every detail
of the proposed arrangement.' 7 But this expanded-choice thesis im-
plicitly presumes a neutral policy towards individualized agreements
(including self-enforcing remedies). Atypical parties lose nothing since
they remain unrestrained from designing customized provisions to re-
place the state-supplied terms. 1 8 Prohibiting contract terms that re-
flect the apparent choices of the bargaining parties thus violates the
norm and requires special justification.
There are three possible justifications for the prohibition of self-
enforcing creditor remedies. First, market imperfections may cause
contracting parties to neglect the interests of third parties or permit
one party to exploit the other unfairly. Regulation corrects the market
failure. Second, the regulation may be justified on paternalistic
grounds. Here the law quite consciously overrules the judgment of the
individual on the ground that she is incapable of perceiving her own
best interests. Finally, the regulation may promote a socially desirable
distribution of entitlements. In this case, the norm of expanded choice
may be sacrificed in order to achieve distributional fairness.
The following discussion challenges each of the conventional argu-
ments for prohibiting self-enforcing remedies. The analysis is compli-
cated by the possibility that, notwithstanding the lost-value rhetoric,
the current regulatory scheme can be explained and justified as a mech-
anism for restraining excessive consumption of credit. Thus conceived,
the limitations on coercive collection may be only a proxy for a deliber-
ate social policy of credit rationing. Nevertheless, at bottom, all at-
tempts to justify current regulation rest on the evidence that individual
debtors make systematic cognitive errors and are vulnerable to impul-
sive behavior. While these impairments are well-established, the com-
pelling evidence that individuals use self-monitoring techniques and
thus approach decision making strategically undermines the claims of
aberrant judgment. The challenge, then, is to explore the failure of
conventional theories and to discover why the intuition that regulation
is a "good thing" persists. I conclude that the pressure for reform can
be understood-if not fully justified-only by focusing on the strong
perception that regulating coercive remedies promotes distributional
117. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 971-72; Goetz & Scott, supra note 56, at
1089-90.
118. See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Inter-
actions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 264-89
(1985) (discussing the dynamics of the interaction between express and implied terms,
and the extent to which the state implicitly regulates the formulation process).
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fairness-a perception that comes from individuals' aversion to bearing
concentrated losses.
A. Market-Failure Justifications
1. Challenging Conventional Theories. - A contract term that results
from an imperfection in the market or the bargaining process may not
represent the true preferences of the parties. The notion is that regula-
tion will correct the deficiency and induce people to reach agreements
that correspond to the result they would have reached had the market
operated properly. Three elements are required to justify regulation
on the grounds of market failure: (1) a defect in the market; (2) a reason
to believe that the defect generates contract terms that would not be
chosen in a perfectly functioning market; and (3) a reason to believe
that regulation will provide the necessary corrective.
a. Inadequate Information and Cognitive Error. - In the case of con-
sumer credit transactions, several factors suggest that market forces will
not produce optimal contract terms. The terms of credit contracts are
not expressed in any standardized form, but instead are often formu-
lated in arcane, technical language. Standardized terms would provide
a uniform, and therefore intelligible, system of communication. A
debtor who invested resources to understand fully the effects of a par-
ticular term could apply her knowledge to understand subsequent pro-
visions cast in the same form. Thus, if creditors embodied remedial
terms in a standard formulation, a debtor could compare more accu-
rately the risks inherent in different combinations of terms.1 19 But indi-
vidual creditors have insufficient incentive to provide clearer terms that
are more easily comparable with available alternatives. Because an in-
dividual creditor cannot capture the benefits from educating consumers
on the function of particular terms, each creditor has an insufficient
motivation to encourage consumers to shop for different remedial ar-
rangements. 120 In short, high search costs, nonstandard formulations
and insufficient incentives to provide clearer explanations of the effects
of particular terms create information deficits that challenge the as-
sumption of expanded choice.
Information deficits and high search costs, however, do not neces-
sarily establish market failure. If the market is competitive, the pres-
119. See id. at 286-88; see also Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Mar-
kets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 1387, 1420-25 (1983) (exploring the effect of consumer comparison shopping on
the competitive equilibrium of security-interest markets).
120. There are several reasons why market forces are inadequate to assure an opti-
mal supply of clear, standardized contract terms. For example, "[t]he limits of copyright
law create an initial barrier to innovation by denying creditors substantial property
rights in their formulations. An inherent free rider problem thus retards the production
of innovative formulations .... [Furthermore, the] difficulty in coordinating a move to
new contractual language constitutes another barrier to innovation." Goetz & Scott,
supra note 118, at 292 (footnote omitted).
1989]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ence of a sufficient number of "shoppers" should generate optimal
terms even though the majority free rides on the efforts of those who
shop.' 2 ' The conventional argument for regulation thus must rest on
the premise that, in certain cases, systematic cognitive errors impair
even the ability of the shoppers to bargain for the terms they prefer.
Creditor remedies are seen as peculiarly susceptible to cognitive error
because they are anchored to the prospect of default-a prospect that
seems a remote risk at the time of contracting. The assumption that
these terms are peculiarly susceptible to systematic errors of judgment
supports the inference that the market cannot be trusted to generate an
optimal contractual arrangement. By prohibiting the use of particularly
worrisome contract terms, such as security interests in household
goods, wage assignments and exemption waivers, the state may be able
to ameliorate the more pernicious effects of cognitive error.1 22
At first glance, this seems a wholly plausible argument. Indeed,
the FTC explicitly adopted it as the basis for the current credit practices
rule.' 23 There is, after all, substantial social science evidence that con-
sumers make systematic errors in their cognitive judgments and deci-
sions. These errors are often attributable to heuristic principles-
principles that are useful tools for simplifying complex judgments but
that also can lead to severe biases.' 24 Of particular relevance to the
case of creditor remedies are the powerful effects of the anchoring
point-or how the choice is framed-in individuals' assessments of the
gains and losses from any particular choice.' 25 Anchoring the coercive
121. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 119, at 1402-16.
122. The arguments for regulation based on cognitive error are carefully summa-
rized and analyzed in id. at 1425-50.
123. FTC Rule, supra note 4, at 7747 ("the average consumer does not focus on
elements of a transaction that are distant in time and probability").
124. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A.
Tversky, supra note 107; R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Short-
comings of Social Judgment 17-42 (1980); Abelson & Levi, Decision Making and Deci-
sion Theory, in I The Handbook of Social Psychology 231, 233-34, 246-47 (3d ed.
1985); Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the
Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1986).
Experimental evidence indicates, for example, that individuals systematically ignore
sample size and base rates in making probability assessments, an error designated as the
"representativeness heuristic." In addition, the "availability heuristic" describes the
tendency of individuals to be too strongly influenced in their inferences by the ease with
which prior instances can be brought to mind. For a review of the experimental research
that established these and related errors, see Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
125. According to the axioms of consistency and invariance, the preference order
among options should -not depend on the manner in which they are described. Using
tests with experimental subjects, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky explain the con-
sistent failure of these axioms in terms of the dominance of the anchoring point in how
individuals assess the gains or losses from any particular choice. See Kahneman & Tver-
sky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 Am. Psychologist 341 (1984) [hereinafter
Kahneman & Tversky, Choices]; Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
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threat of self-enforcement to a remote risk may irredeemably impair the
ability of consumers to evaluate the risk correctly. Moreover, the error
will not be random. Individuals tend to overestimate the probability of
conjunctive events, such as the events leading to successful repayment,
and to underestimate the risk of disjunctive events, such as those caus-
ing default.' 26 As a result, consumers are not fully compensated for
bearing the risk of coercive execution and (presumably) would prefer
credit contracts without self-enforcing remedies.
This argument loses much of its force, however, when the question
is reevaluated from an ex ante perspective. A bargaining approach fo-
cuses attention on the equally substantial evidence that individuals may
voluntarily regulate or limit their choices in a variety of different
ways. 127 Thus, an inference of judgmental bias must be assessed to-
gether with the equally compelling evidence that individuals commonly
employ a variety of self-monitoring techniques and thus approach deci-
sion making strategically.' 28 For instance, there are two possible expla-
the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman,
Framing]. The relevance of framing variations for legal policy is discussed in Scott,
supra note 109, at 338-42.
126. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 124, at 1129. These biases are explained as
the product of anchoring. The overall probability of a conjunctive event is lower than
the probability of each elementary event, whereas the overall probability of a disjunctive
event is higher than the probability of each elementary event. Id. at 1128-30.
127. The theory of self-command or precommitment describes how the individual
limits or modifies future behavior in order to ensure that a commitment to a present
decision is not subsequently compromised. In essence, precommitment theory explores
the motivations and devices by which a decision maker reinforces a choice made today
by taking steps to prevent a contrary decision being made tomorrow. For a representa-
tive sampling of the economic literature, see Schelling, Ethics, Law and the Exercise of
Self-Command, in Choices and Consequences 83 (1984); Thaler & Shefrin, An Eco-
nomic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 392 (1981); Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Organization 39 (1980). In addition,
psychologists have done considerable research on the techniques people deliberately
use to modify their future behavior. See, e.g., K. O'Leary & G. Wilson, Behavior Ther-
apy: Application and Outcome 470-73 (1975).
128. According to self-monitoring theory, an individual actively attempts to con-
struct a pattern of behavior appropriate to a particular context or goal. For those indi-
viduals who monitor and regulate their behavioral choices, the impact of situational cues
is likely to be considerable. Empirical evidence has provided documentation for these
theoretical propositions. See Snyder, Cognitive, Behavioral, and Interpersonal Conse-
quences of Self-Monitoring, in 5 Advances in the Study of Communication and Effect
181, 193-94 (1979); Snyder, Self-Monitoring Processes, in 12 Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology 86, 121 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1979). Using information-processing con-
cepts, Carver and Scheier have developed a complete theory of self-regulation that they
call control theory. They suggest that an individual's focus of attention shifts back and
forth between the environment and the self. They have experimental evidence that an
increase in self-focus will cause conformity to situationally salient standards. See C.
Carver & M. Scheier, Attention and Self-Regulation: A Control Theory Approach to
Human Behavior (1981); Carver & Scheier, Control Theory: A Useful Conceptual
Framework for Personality-Social, Clinical, and Heath Psychology, 92 Psychological
Bull. 111 (1982).
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nations for consumers' apparent consent to self-enforcing creditor
remedies. One is the biasing effects of framing. Many consumers may
underestimate the costs of coercive action because the option is at-
tached to a remote risk that is seen as the cost of obtaining a desired
gain (the $10,000 of credit). There is, however, another possible expla-
nation for the revealed preferences of consumers for self-enforcing
terms. Consumers may be accepting coercive remedies as a precom-
mitment or self-command mechanism designed to discourage weak will
and to control their own internal conflicts between short-term and
long-term goals. By following such a rule-don't overextend your risky
debt-the consumer can modify his future behavior in order to ensure
that his commitment to a present decision to repay the obligation is not
subsequently compromised.' 29
The reality of consumer choice in these settings cannot be estab-
lished as a matter of pure theory, but the judgmental process of risk
assessment appears to be inextricably linked to the equally important
process of choice management. A legal policymaker thus must remain
cautious about predicting the effects of legal intervention owing to cog-
nitive errors. Even if policymakers see the biasing effects of framing as
dominating, the best corrective is not the prohibition of self-enforcing
remedies. The cooperative model argues instead for less intrusive reg-
ulatory alternatives because self-enforcing remedies will often be in
consumers' self-interest. Alternatives such as disclosure and cooling-
off periods reduce cognitive errors and also mitigate the information
deficits that cause postdefault coercion. 130
In sum, the assumption of chronic information deficits is not per-
suasive once the inference of cognitive error is integrated with a theory
of strategic commitment and choice management.' 3 1 The conventional
market-failure justification requires an inference of systematic exploita-
tion of consumers that simply does not seem justified by the current
evidence. The risk of systematic manipulation by simple framing illu-
sions seems far less acute once it is recognized that consumers can and
do routinely develop behavioral rules to regulate their future decision
making.' 3 2 Moreover, the cooperative model demonstrates that legal
129. This argument builds on the discussion in Scott, supra note 109, at 337-42.
Individuals are particularly likely to monitor their behavioral choices in environments
that are novel, unfamiliar or able to motivate individuals to adopt a strategic orientation.
See Snyder, On the Influence of Individuals on Situations, in Personality, Cognition and
Social Interaction (1981); Snyder, Impression Management, in Social Psychology in the
Seventies (L. Wrightsman ed. 1977).
130. See, e.g., FTC Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R.
§ 429.1 (1988). For a discussion of these alternative forms of regulation, see infra notes
145-48 and accompanying text.
131. Cognitive error may have implications for paternalistic grounds for regulation.
See infra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
132. The behavioral rules that individuals use to govern their decision making are
usually rational responses to situations. They might seem "irrational" only when one
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prohibitions may have unintended secondary effects. Regulation may
well undermine the precommitment scheme that parties use to manage
their credit choices. Indeed, the preceding analysis underscores the fal-
lacy that state regulation of credit terms can ameliorate significantly the
effects of cognitive errors. If consumers are susceptible to judgmental
biases, then regulators are similarly imperiled. 133
b. Externalities: Regulation as a Method of Credit Rationing. - William
Whitford and others have argued that, notwithstanding the lost-value
rhetoric, the regulation of self-enforcing remedies may have a broader
objective: to restrain the overconsumption of consumer credit.1 34
There are several reasons to believe that unregulated credit transac-
tions might result in a socially excessive consumption of credit. First,
the presence of a pervasive system of social insurance programs means
that debtors will not internalize fully the social costs of default. 135 Un-
employment benefits, food stamps and health care are all paid for as
part of general taxes and available to defaulting debtors without regard
to the riskiness of their credit activities. As with any insurance scheme,
moral hazard causes the insured to underinvest in precautions to re-
duce the probability of claims against the insurance pool.' 3 6
Other externalities may skew the debtor's incentives. The effects
of excessive debt may reduce social productivity as debtors shift to ac-
tivities with a lower marginal social product or may blunt the en-
trepreneurial instincts of other potential debtors.' 37 Furthermore, the
debtor may not consider fully the impact of default on dependents and
other third parties.' 3 8 The claim that the parties do not internalize
fully the social costs of default thus provides an alternative basis for
state intervention. Limitations on self-enforcing remedies may simply
be a crude but presumably effective method of credit rationing.
It is undeniable that substantial externalities impair the operation
of consumer credit transactions. For example, the administrative costs
fails to take into account precommitment strategies and the transaction costs of
deciding.
133. A seldom-appreciated point is that much of the decision theory literature is
directed toward minimizing the judgmental biases of social science investigators and
other neutral decision makers. See Abelson & Levi, supra note 124, at 293-97.
134. See, e.g., Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests, supra note 6,
at 998; Jackson, supra note 42, at 1404-24.
135. See Jackson, supra note 42, at 1401-04.
136. Rea, supra note 62, at 191-92; Schelling, supra note 127, at 7 ("Any compen-
sating program directed toward a condition over which people have any kind of control,
even remote and probabilistic control, reduces the incentive to stay out of that condition
and detracts from the urgency of getting out of it.").
137. This argument presumes that there are psychic costs to default that lead to
excessive conservatism by third parties.
138. Interdependent utilities would seem to negate any inference that debtors fail
to consider the effects of defaults on their dependents. Tom Jackson suggests, however,
that the costs of communicating preferences even among family members will lead to
underassessment by debtors. See Jackson, supra note 42, at 1419.
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of a wage assignment may fall on the debtor's employer. Alternatively,
the effects of repossession of personal property may be felt primarily by
the debtor's friends, family or other third parties. Nevertheless, the ex-
ternality claim suffers from two severe and related problems. First,
even assuming the diagnosis to be correct, the cure does not fit the
disease. Self-enforcing remedies cause debtors to internalize some of
the costs of default.13 9 While regulation may reduce credit consump-
tion at the margin, the curbs on coercive remedies will also encourage
risk-seeking behavior by those who obtain installment credit and will
exacerbate any third-party effects.140
Moreover, the regulation of self-enforcing remedies seems inade-
quate as a metering mechanism. Prohibiting self-enforcing remedies
marginally reduces the supply of credit, and as a result, the absolute levels
of credit defaults will fall. To that extent, regulating remedies does
have a metering effect on overconsumption. But a cooperative bargain-
ing perspective suggests that such regulation also increases the rate of
default since debtors are less restrained from postcredit improvidence.
In short, regulation designed to prevent overconsumption by prohibit-
ing a mechanism for reducing the risk of overconsumption seems quite
perverse. An excise tax on credit extension would appear to be a far
more effective metering device if credit rationing is the goal.
2. The Case for Alternative Forms of Regulation.
a. The Problem of Creditor Misbehavior. - If the current regulation of
coercive remedies is taken at face value, its purpose is to restrain unde-
sirable and exploitative coercion in the collection process. On those
terms, the regulation seems misfocused. Moreover, it ignores the
structural imperatives that characterize the consumer credit transac-
tion. If the commitment to self-enforcing remedies has significant
predefault benefits for both parties, then substitute commitment mech-
anisms soon will be devised. These new commitments also will appear
139. One might argue, to the contrary, that coercive remedies will exacerbate the
externality problem if the effect of enforcing the remedy (such as wage garnishment) is
to cause debtors to quit theirjobs. This might occur if the difference between the level
of public welfare benefits and the allowable exemption from garnishment were so small
that it was not worth it for debtors to work for the difference. This point, however, does
not argue for prohibiting wage assignments altogether. Rather, it implies that wage ex-
emptions must be set sufficiently above the relevant welfare entitlements so that a signif-
icant incentive to work remains.
140. Indeed, the argument can be rephrased in terms of insurance. The pervasive
nature of social insurance and debt-forgiveness policies produces a moral hazard that
self-enforcing remedies mitigate in much the same way that deductibles correct for
moral hazard in the context of privately issued insurance. Thus, rather than being in-
compatible with social welfare norms, coercive remedies are an important complemen-
tary mechanism. See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and
Irrationality 85-86 (1979) ("It is crucial that there be some correlation between the
extent to which individuals engage in risky activities and their contribution to social




coercive whenever a debtor defaults. And the substitute terms are
likely to be less effective in regulating self-interested behavior by both
parties.
Not only do current initiatives appear to increase the risk of debtor
misbehavior (and thus increase the incidence of unsuccessful transac-
tions), but the present scheme may have the pernicious effect of exacer-
bating the risk of creditor misbehavior. The distorting effects of the
single-minded focus on postdefault coercion is vividly illustrated by the
incoherence of the FTC's regulatory scheme. The FTC rule labels as
equivalently injurious security interests in household goods and wage
assignments while declining to prohibit purchase money security inter-
ests in consumer durables because the latter are seen as providing sig-
nificant benefits to creditors. 14 '
This distinction is perverse. The assignment of future human capi-
tal or a security interest in household goods is a paradigmatic illustra-
tion of a "puny prince" economic hostage. In both cases, the pledged
assets are more valuable to the debtor than to the creditor. While these
devices may or may not impose undesirable psychic costs, they have a
benign function in disciplining the behavior of the creditor as well as
the debtor. On the other hand, the purchase money security interest in
consumer durables has independent market value to the creditor. The
prime candidates for regulation are these types of self-enforcing terms
that may present an unacceptable risk of creditor misbehavior. Some
creditors may seize upon an excuse (perhaps a late payment) to induce
default and to enforce the security interest by repossession, resale and
deficiency suit.
Inducing default will be a sensible strategy for the creditor only if
the gains from repossession or other enforcement exceed any reputa-
tional losses. Alan Schwartz has demonstrated that it is implausible to
believe that creditors can systematically recover more than the out-
standing debt without being obligated to return the surplus to the
debtor. 142 The model does cast some doubt, however, on the assump-
tion that profit-maximizing creditors will necessarily maximize the pro-
ceeds of any resales. Clearly, creditors have incentives to maximize
their net returns from enforcing security interests. But the resale moti-
vation is partially skewed by the need to maintain a credible reputation
for subsequent debtors. Large uncollectible deficiencies signal to other
debtors the creditor's resolve to fulfill the repossession commitment
regardless of the cost. The resulting advertising expense may be a
profit-maximizing marginal cost that generates corresponding revenues
through improved performance of other credit contracts.' 43
141. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1988); see FTC Rule, supra
note 4, at 7784.
142. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 132-39.
143. Challenging the maximizing assumption does not, by itself, justify additional
regulation of repossession sales. Under current law, the creditor, as the selling agent, is
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A plausible case for creditor misbehavior also arises when changed
circumstances (such as a shift in interest rates) cause the creditor to
regret the terms of the original credit transaction. Induced default al-
lows the creditor to cover any losing market gamble and to continue to
urge repayment for those cases in which the external market conditions
remain favorable to the creditor. While evidence of market shifts that
motivate creditors to misbehave might be generally available, it is un-
likely that bad motives could be established in individual cases. Thus,
the danger of unprovable fraud could provide the basis for a radical
solution: the prohibition of commitments that may prove too seductive
to creditors.
144
The speculative nature of the misbehavior claims argues against
the draconian step of regulating presumptive fraud. Many other fac-
tors, including competition and reputational constraints, bear on the
question of systematic unprovable misbehavior. But, in any case, the
irony is that the zeal to avoid "lost value" collection techniques may
have led the FTC to ignore the potential for real exploitation.
b. Disclosure and Related Solutions to Predefault Error and Postdefault Co-
ercion. - A bargaining theory approach does not imply that predefault
judgmental errors and postdefault coercion are inappropriate subjects
for regulation. Rather, the evidence that self-enforcing remedies may
have benign as well as malignant effects argues for alternative regula-
tory devices. A cooling-off period prior to concluding the credit trans-
action offers individuals a valuable tool for correcting any judgmental
errors in assessing the consequences of self-enforcing terms. Substan-
tial research evidence indicates that access to such "tools" dramatically
reduces the incidence of cognitive errors in individual decision
making. 145
Furthermore, the utility of self-enforcing terms depends on their
clarity and predictability as signals of the parties' intentions. If these
required to dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. U.C.C. § 9-
504(3) (1981) (requiring that "every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable"). Presumably, this
provision is violated if advertising costs are charged off against the defaulting debtor.
Nevertheless, the difficulty in establishing the creditor's motivations in particular cases
may argue for a more restrictive prophylactic rule.
144. The risk of creditor misbehavior that attends purchase money security inter-
ests in consumer durables raises a challenge to the cooperative model: if puny prince
economic hostages are the ideal arrangement, why do debtors ever grant security inter-
ests in valuable assets? Clearly, purchase money security intersts serve traditional func-
tions (an asset claim upon default and priority vis-i-vis other creditors) in addition to
their possible utility as valuable precommitments. The prevalence of such arrangements
suggests that their asset-based advantages dominate their inadequacies as economic
hostages.
145. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 124, at 267. A possible solution to
framing problems, for example, is to employ multiple framings, such as "(a) you have a
10o chance of defaulting on this obligation and (b) you have a 90%o chance of success-
fully paying off this obligation."
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terms have been inadequately designed or tested, or are formulated in
arcane language, they invite misunderstanding, disagreement and, ulti-
mately, mutual conflict. As explained earlier, individual creditors have
inadequate incentive to develop standardized and precisely calibrated
self-enforcing remedies.1 46 One appropriate role for the state, there-
fore, is to specify a standard formulation for each provision that carries
a legally unambiguous meaning. 147 Standardization clarifies the choice
between self-enforcing terms and postjudgment collection procedures.
Improving the quality of the signal thus will enhance the credibility of
the resulting commitment as well.
More vexing problems are evident in the postdefault maneuvers
each party uses to discover the other's "reservation price." The model
suggests that postdefault coercion is caused by each party's uncertainty
about the choices preferred by the other and not by resort to self-en-
forcing remedies. This implies that undesirable coercion is better ad-
dressed by attempts to mitigate the information deficits faced by
creditors and debtors. The problem the parties face once the debtor
defaults is that information exchange, standing alone, is not likely to
reduce bargaining costs. In this situation, "talk is cheap" and is not a
substitute for action or strategic moves, even when the moves may be
costly. While bluffs, feints and other maneuvers do not unambiguously
reveal one's position (indeed, they may be deliberately deceptive), they
nevertheless have an evidentiary quality that speech does not.
Arthur Leff has argued that the cost of postdefault coercion could
be reduced by establishing a state-subsidized mediation service special-
izing in debtor-creditor problems.' 48 Mediation is essentially an ex-
tended settlement negotiation in which parties exchange confidential
information to neutralize the risk of mischaracterization of the other's
actions. Leff correctly saw that a disinterested referee could be an im-
portant ingredient in reducing the uncertainty of each party's estimates
of the other's position. Unfortunately, daunting problems seem to
frustrate any workable scheme to implement Leff's suggestion. It
rarely will be in any individual creditor's interest to engage in voluntary
collective mediation with other creditors. Each creditor has an incen-
tive to pursue coercive collection individually in order to secure a
larger share of the common pool of assets. Nevertheless, the informa-
tion-based interventions suggested by Leff are worth exploring not
only because they are less intrusive than absolute prohibitions, but also
because they address the problem of coercion directly. This is espe-
146. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
147. Although "[d]efinitional recognition does not change the optional character of
these [express] terms," it does standardize the terms' meaning regardless of the context
in which they are employed. Goetz & Scott, supra note 118, at 282. Ideally, the parties
should be able to pick and choose among a predetermined menu of such standardized
remedial options in order to construct an optimal enforcement scheme.
148. Leff, supra note 6, at 42-46.
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cially true since the ex ante perspective casts considerable doubt on our
ability to predict whether prohibition of credit terms is likely to amelio-
rate the problems caused by imperfect markets or to impose even more
pernicious secondary costs.
B. Paternalistic Justifications
Under a criterion of consumer welfare, disclosure and other infor-
mation-based solutions seem superior to prohibitions on self-enforcing
remedies. Current regulation, however, may be justifiable on paternal-
istic grounds. Legal regulation is often motivated by paternalism. But
paternalistic grounds for regulation rarely are acknowledged explicitly
because often they are inconsistent with the norms of personal auton-
omy and expanded choice. As a result, some understandable confusion
exists as to precisely which justifications are properly characterized as
paternalistic. Duncan Kennedy has proposed a typology that provides a
useful distinction between paternalistic, distributional and efficiency
grounds for intervention. Kennedy defines paternalism as the overrul-
ing of the preferences of an affected group. The justification is pater-
nalistic rather than distributive or allocative because the supposed
beneficiaries do not agree that they are better off, and they would pre-
fer to return to the prior regime were they free to do so.
14 9
The key concept of overruling preferences suggests why regula-
tions designed to correct cognitive biases or prevent difficult-to-detect
forms of fraud are not necessarily paternalistic. The question is
whether the affected parties, considering the issue free from the dis-
torting effects of deception or judgmental bias, would agree that the
regulation benefits them. To be strictly paternalistic, the regulation
must be made for the benefit of the affected individuals whether they
like it or not. Obvious examples of paternalistic regulation include the
nonenforceability of contracts made by infants and incompetents, as
well as prohibitions against self-enslavement. Notwithstanding the
plasticity of the categorization, at least two regulatory traditions are
strictly paternalistic.
1. Personal Integrity. - One form of paternalistic regulation is what
Anthony Kronman identifies as "the idea of personal integrity."' 50
This idea embraces those prohibitions that preclude someone from
trading away too much of his personal liberty. Examples include re-
strictions on self-enslavement' 5 1 or agreements not to divorce.' 52
Kronman attempts to ground the idea of personal integrity on the prin-
149. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev.
563, 624-29 (1982).
150. Kronman, supra note 42, at 765; see id. at 774-86 (discussing personal integ-
rity as a justification for paternalism).
151. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 (1982).
152. See Kronman, supra note 42, at 764 & n.8.
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ciple of autonomy. But if personal integrity is defined as the liberty to
use oneself in whichever way seems best, 153 then the resulting regula-
tion is inherently contradictory. One of the incidents of autonomy, af-
ter all, is the right to trade or exchange your entitlements whenever it is
in your best interests to do so.
t 54
The restraints against leveraging one's future personal liberty are
better seen in terms of a communitarian norm. When individual integ-
rity is compromised, the collective is diminished. Thus, the collective
binds itself to forego those gains that can only be purchased by the
sacrifice of an individual's self-respect.
155
The problem with regulation based on the common good, how-
ever, is that the idea does not appear to have a limiting principle.
Pushed to the extreme, a communitarian justification undermines the
very notion of personal liberty that underlies individual entitlements.
Kronman suggests that the limiting factor is whether the individual is
able to depersonalize his commitment by substituting a monetary pen-
alty or damages for the original commitment.15 6 The more impersonal
the commitment, the less likely it is to threaten individual self-
respect.1
57
Thus conceived, the personal-integrity idea is a useful criterion for
assessing the regulation of coercive remedies. It explains the universal
reluctance to sanction physically coercive commitments (arm-twisting)
that prove so effective in extralegal contexts. But self-enforcing reme-
dies that impose only impersonal costs-such as those prohibited by
the FTC rule-would not violate the personal-integrity norm. To be
sure, the psychic costs of depriving an individual of a portion of current
income or personal belongings may equally impair self-respect. Never-
theless, the distinction between commitments that are measured in
money's worth and those that require transfer of the entitlement itself
is well-entrenched in our legal system. At least on this basis, personal
integrity is not sacrificed by self-enforcing creditor remedies. 158
153. See id. at 775.
154. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 154-56.
155. It is also possible to ground the idea of personal integrity in the concept of
human fallibility (or poorjudgment) discussed infra at text accompanying notes 159-75.
Under this argument, individuals are not allowed to enslave themselves because there
are alternative ways of earning money for food and shelter and of bonding future
promises, and because the slavery penalty is so severe. A blanket prohibition might be
seen as an acknowledgment that such bargains are almost always irrational. The same
may be true for absolutely binding no-divorce obligations. This is particularly so given
the enormous difficulty in ensuring that the other party to slavery or no-divorce agree-
ments does not exploit the agreement. See E. Scott, Rational Decision-Making in Mar-
riage and Divorce (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Columbia Law Review).
156. See Kronman, supra note 42, at 778-79.
157. See id. at 780.
158. A weaker form of the personal integrity idea would justify the prohibition of
self-enforcing remedies as promoting minimum standards of decency in credit transac-
tions. See Braucher, supra note 10, at 394, 428-29; Whitford, A Critique, supra note 6,
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2. PoorJudgment. - The idea of personal integrity does not explain
prohibitions on the contracts of infants or incompetents or on the
nonwaivability of bankruptcy discharge or the regulation of the riski-
ness of financial intermediaries. 1 59 These restrictions are motivated by
a second form of paternalism-the idea of human fallibility or poor
judgment. The claim is simple: sometimes people need to be pro-
tected from themselves. °6 0 Either certain people or all people under
certain circumstances have insufficient capacities to know or choose the
risks that (by some established criterion) they ought to prefer.
The poor-judgment claim differs from the simple cognitive illusion
argument presented earlier. Here, the affected parties may not appre-
ciate the restraint even after the biasing effects of the cognitive heuristic
are removed. In the case of infants and incompetents, the classification
is generic and rests on the assumption of immature judgment.' 6 ' In-
fants are inclined to recklessness and naivet6, and, in Kronman's words,
they lack "moral imagination."' 6 2 Since the restraint is grounded in
immaturity, it is temporal in character. Restraints of this sort are simi-
lar to the more familiar cooling-off periods found in other forms of
contractual regulation. They merely postpone the opportunity to make
a binding commitment in the future.
Whatever the legitimacy of the presumption of immature judg-
ment, it is not relevant to our concerns. Specific prohibitions, such as
the nonenforceability of waivers of bankruptcy discharge, involve re-
at 1112-14. A decency or humanist justification argues that a person's sense of self is
irreparably impaired if personal possessions or cherished family heirlooms are taken (or
given) away. Possessions give life meaning, and blanket security interests may imper-
missibly threaten these values. The decency justification for prohibition, however, suf-
fers from two problems. First, it is hard to claim that self-enforcing remedies are more
indecent than ordinary postjudgment execution. In both cases, a defaulting debtor may
be deprived of property that she can ill afford to lose. If any aspect of consumer credit
transactions is indecent, it is the freedom to enter into risky debt contracts that one may
be unable to perform. More significantly, the argument that self-enforcing remedies are
too harsh or oppressive assumes the very fact at issue-that these terms serve no benefi-
cial functions. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 10, at 428 (arguing that there is a "moral
repugnance [to] threats that would have had only spite value if carried out"). If, to the
contrary, self-help repossession serves important purposes in maintaining the parties'
commitments, then the assumption that enforcement is purely gratuitous fails. In short,
having empathy for debtors who default does not respond to the equally legitimate
claims for empathy of those debtors who pay.
159. See, e.g., Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale L.J. 1,
11-16 (1976).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mathews, 379 So. 2d 1245, 1247-48 (Ala. 1980) (in-
competence includes inability to reason and exercise judgment); Kiefer v. Fred Howe
Motors, Inc., 39 Wis. 2d 20, 24, 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1968) (arguing that "the minor
[is] immature in both mind and experience and that, therefore, he should be protected
from his bad judgments"); R. Scott & D. Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 341-66
(1988).
162. Kronman, supra note 42, at 790-96.
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straints that are both more severe and more focused. Thomas Jackson
has developed a normative justification for the prohibition on discharge
waivers based on a theory of overcommitment or aberrant judg-
ments. 163 Individuals are entirely forbidden from making certain com-
mitments, Jackson argues, because in these specific instances their
generally sound and reliable judgment systematically breaks down.
164
Jackson's argument is a useful one to assess from the ex ante perspective
of the cooperative model, since self-enforcing creditor remedies and
discharge waivers are functionally similar terms. Presumably, their pro-
hibition should rest on the same normative foundations.
Left to their own devices, the argument goes, many individuals will
gamble with their futures, ignoring long-term preferences in order to
indulge short-term desires. The literature on impulsive behavior pro-
vides at least some support for the idea of overcommitment. In a pio-
neering paper, R.H. Strotz demonstrated that, given plausible
assumptions about the way future preferences are discounted, individu-
als whose preference ordering is constant nonetheless may make incon-
sistent choices over time.165 For example, an individual will choose
smaller, earlier rewards despite an initial preference for larger, later
ones. 166
The paradox of rational decision makers acting on inconsistent
preferences does not necessarily justify paternalistic regulation. The
overcommitment justification requires policymakers to link volitional
impairments with cognitive biases in order to isolate those specific in-
stances when individuals are likely to suffer from weak will. 1 67 Recent
work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provides at least some
basis for such a determination. Kahneman and Tversky have developed
a theory of judgment which posits that individuals evaluate choices in
terms of incremental gains and losses from a given starting point or
anchor.168 The biasing effects of the anchoring point may lead individ-
163. Jackson, supra note 42, at 1405-18.
164. Id. at 1415-18.
165. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 165, 166-71 (1956); see Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent Dy-
namic Choice, 43 Rev. Econ. Stud. 159, 161-63 (1976).
166. Strotz, supra note 165, at 177-78.
167. A volitional impairment occurs when an individual acts impulsively and incon-
sistently with her long-term preferences as she understands them. A cognitive bias oc-
curs when an individual misperceives or misestimates her preferences. Thus, the
argument in brief is that debtors are impulsive in general and likely to be especially
impulsive in credit consumption decisions because their judgment is distorted by cogni-
tive biases.
168. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 125, at 344-45; Kahneman &
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263,
274 (1979); Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra note 125, at 454. Based on a stan-
dard assumption of risk aversion, Kahneman and Tversky propose a theory ofjudgment
with three key features: (1) individuals are risk averse in protecting gains; (2) individuals
are risk seekers in avoiding losses (a sure loss is felt more heavily and, therefore, is more
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uals to overestimate the prospect of repayment and underestimate
those events that might cause a default. 169 Another of the axioms of
their "prospect theory" is based on the demonstrated biases of individ-
uals toward very low probability contingencies. 170 Very low probabili-
ties are either overweighted or neglected altogether, making such
contingencies highly unstable in the decision-making calculus of the in-
dividual. Building on this research, Jackson argues that individuals
would therefore prefer to bind themselves not to engage in impulsive
commitments creating such a heightened risk of error. 171 The regula-
tion of discharge waivers, just like the regulation of self-enforcing rem-
edies, thus represents a state-imposed commitment not to commit.
As Jackson freely concedes, this argument has difficulties. Chief
among them is the mandatory character of the prohibition. Jackson's
argument may well support an initial "off-the-rack" presumption
against such contract terms. But it is more difficult to explain why (per-
haps following a cooling-off period) specific individuals could not see it
in their own best interests to make such commitments in particular in-
stances. Jackson bolsters his theory, therefore, by arguing that
mandatory regulation can be independently justified by the social inter-
est in restraining overconsumption of credit.'
72
The poor-judgment claim overcomes some of the difficulties that
undermine the externality argument for credit rationing. Here, the
overconsumption criterion rests on a paternalistic assessment of human
fallibility and not on the use of regulation as a market corrective. Thus,
it avoids the inherent contradiction of correcting externalities by ban-
ning terms that actually internalize costs. Nevertheless, two key
counterarguments are suggested by the cooperative model. First, the
evidence that individuals approach decision making strategically should
increase our confidence that they can use rational, self-generated rules to
control against overcommitment and weak will.173 Moreover, the prev-
alence of precommitment techniques complicates the inferences that
distressing than a gamble between losing nothing or losing an even greater sum); and
(3) losses loom larger than gains in human judgment when the prospects of either are
equally probable. This "prospect theory" plays a pivotal role in current research on
judgmental errors because it helps explain empirically observed behavior that violates
the basic axioms of rational choice.
169. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 124, at 1129; see supra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text.
170. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 125, at 344-46.
171. Jackson, supra note 42, at 1415-16.
172. Id. at 1424. Recast in slightly different form, this claim is a variation of the
externality argument outlined above. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
173. The use of economic hostages in installment loans not only bonds the debtor's
promise vis-i-vis the creditor: it also bonds the promise vis-i-vis the debtor herself.
Thus, it is a classic precommitment mechanism. Arguments based on irrationality or
poor judgment typically fail to take account of this benefit because they tend to ignore
the transaction costs of making choices generally. For a discussion of precommitment
techniques, see Scott, supra note 109, at 345.
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may properly be drawn from the experimental evidence of cognitive
illusions. 174 By banning a particular contract term, the state completely
removes the arrangement from the range of choices available to simi-
larly situated consumers. If expanded choice is the background norm,
the policymaker should remove a transaction type from the market only
if there is confidence that consumers' judgments are irredeemably im-
paired. While a simple cognitive error analysis may provide that confi-
dence, the lessons of choice management argue against an uncritical
reliance on such analysis. Since "irrational" choices may often be as
plausibly explained by adherence to internal rules as by preference ma-
nipulation, it is unlikely that policymakers can accurately predict the
cases of aberrant judgment.'
75
The social benefits of consumers' commitments offer a second rea-
son to question the wisdom of blanket restraints. The paternalistic ar-
gument assumes that self-enforcing remedies or bankruptcy waivers
only serve to indulge individuals' short-term impulses for overcon-
sumption. Bargaining theory argues, to the contrary, that those devices
are useful instruments to reinforce a commitment to socially beneficial
long-term objectives. A bankruptcy discharge waiver commits the
debtor's future human capital to the contractual objective. The com-
mitment of human capital is credible since the asset is valuable to the
consumer, but the risk of creditor misbehavior is remote since the asset
is specific to the debtor and thus has no independent market value.
Furthermore, a cooperative perspective suggests that both the debtor
and the creditor believe the commitment is beneficial in reducing the
risk of overconsumption. This perspective also moderates any infer-
ence of aberrant judgment. Neither the institutional orientation nor
the individual loan officer, after all, is likely to be imperiled by impul-
sive behavior or other cognitive errors in this context.
In sum, regulating creditor remedies in order to meter the con-
sumption of consumer credit is as problematic when the intervention is
paternalistic as it is when the regulation is premised on market failures.
In either case, the instrument for affecting the desired social policy
seems unnecessarily crude and counterproductive. To solve the puzzle
174. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. Recent work by Ward Ed-
wards and Detlof von Winterfeldt has shown that cognitive errors are reduced if individ-
uals are allowed to use "tools" or other intellectual aids to make probability assessments
and inferences. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 124, at 260.
175. The difficulty of drawing inferences directly from the cognitive error literature
is compounded by the possibility that these various biases may in some cases offset one
another. For example, in the case of default and repossession, one could argue that an
availability bias moderates any anchoring effect. Repossession of household goods and
wage assignments are fairly vivid and stark events; the risk of those events occurring may
thus be overestimated to some extent, thereby correcting for the likely tendency to underes-
timate the risk of insolvency as an abstract matter. In effect, seemingly harsh reposses-
sion remedies serve to make the abstract risk of default more vivid and hence to
counteract other risk assessment biases.
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of why this particular method of intervention has been selected, we
need to turn finally to the distributional effects of regulation.
C. The Distributive Justice Case for Regulation
A redistributive justification for regulating self-enforcing terms
rests on the premise that it is "fairer" or more just to change the cur-
rent distribution of rights upon default in a way that helps one party or
group at the expense of another. Since the regulation of creditor reme-
dies dearly has distributive effects (at least for cases in which the debtor
defaults), the distributional case for regulation is worth discussing in
some detail.
Anthony Kronman has argued that terms found in contracts of ad-
hesion, such as the consumer credit agreement, are properly subject to
scrutiny on distributional grounds.1 76 If the imbalance of power re-
flected by the adhesion contract involves the distribution of control
over important matters of social concern such as society's available
housing stock, the terms are properly subject to regulation. 177 Society
cares about the fair distribution of certain essential rights and inter-
venes to achieve distributional fairness in such cases. Thus conceived,
the prohibition of self-enforcing remedies shifts some of the control
over the instruments of postdefault bargaining from one group (credi-
tors) to another (debtors who default) in a way that furthers the widely
shared goal of ensuring everyone a minimal freedom from psychic in-
jury. To achieve this goal, the coercive remedies must be absolutely
prohibited. Otherwise, debtors would be expected to waive their initial
entitlement to noncoercive default, thereby restoring whatever distri-
butional inequities existed at the start.
Kronman's argument leaves several key criteria unspecified. In the
first place, he suggests that the distinction between power imbalances
that are not the cause for social concern, such as the distribution of
control over artwork, and those that require redistribution, such as
power over the nation's housing stock, can be made by simple appeals
to common moral intuitions. 178 Furthermore, his criterion for inequi-
table distribution is the presence of standard form contracts. 179 While
standardization of contract terms is some indication of relative
"power," it is a poor criterion for assessing the unfairness of a particu-
lar exchange.
At least some of the indeterminacy in Kronman's argument can be
resolved by a more careful selection of a criterion for distributional fair-
ness. A possible solution to the problem of how to measure distribu-
176. Kronman, supra note 42, at 770-74; see also Kronman, Contract Law and
DistributiveJustice, 89 Yale LJ. 472, 499-501 (1980) (discussing methods for achieving
distributive goals through contract law).
177. Kronman, supra note 42, at 771.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 772.
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tional fairness (putting aside for the moment the even more intractable
problem of what we mean by fairness) is to adapt some of the instru-
ments suggested by "superfairness" theory.' 80 Superfairness analysis
is grounded in the games of fair division. Everyone is familiar with the
concept of divide and choose: one person cuts the cake and the other
then chooses. The utility of this process is that it achieves a fair distri-
bution in terms of the preferences of the persons involved. The divi-
sion may be objectively unequal; yet the process ensures that each party
will receive a share that she prefers to the other's or at least that leaves
her indifferent.'
8 1
The fair-division insight has been generalized into criteria of fair-
ness that can be applied to any equitable distribution issue. A distribu-
tion is distributively fair if each class of participants prefers its own
share to the share received by the other group-that is, if no one envies
the other's distribution.' 8 2 An important qualification of superfairness
theory is the distinction between the end-state fairness of a distribution
and the incremental or marginal change in entitlements. A redistribu-
tion of entitlements often will be incrementally unfair in that the group
whose holdings are reduced will envy the increment assigned to the
other.' 83
Now consider how the superfairness criteria can be applied to the
distribution of power to coerce a postdefault settlement. Assume, for
instance, that the distributional question is posed in terms of control
over the bargaining leverages that attend postdefault collection. The
regulation of creditor remedies is distributionally fair if, even after the
regulation of self-enforcing terms, each group would rather have the
bargaining leverage assigned to it rather than the bundle of entitle-
ments received by any others under the new distribution.
184
180. Superfairness analysis is the phrase coined by William Baumol to refer to a
literature that seeks to measure the equity or fairness of any particular distribution solely
in terms of the preferences of the persons involved. For a representative sampling, see
W. Baumol, Superfairness: Applications and Theory (1986); Pazner & Schmeidler, Egal-
itarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity, 92 QJ. Econ. 1671
(1978); Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness, 4
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223 (1975); Varian, Equity, Envy and Efficiency, 9 J. Econ. Theory 63
(1974).
181. W. Baumol, supra note 180, at 9-10.
182. The superfairness criterion has intuitive appeal, but it is not uncontroversial.
See, e.g., Holcombe, Applied Fairness Theory: Comment, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 1153,
153-54 (1983). One of the major concerns is the primacy of envy (or the lack of it) as
the calculus for equitable distribution. Thus, a distribution that benefits one group a
great deal and another only a little may fail the incremental test of superfairness
(although it may be superfair in end-state terms).
183. W. Baumol, supra note 180, at 51-56.
184. This result is possible because the criterion is based on each party's own per-
ception of the distribution. Creditors and debtors may have different preferences for ex-




There are several reasons to reject this distributional account of
the regulation of self-enforcing remedies. In the first place, fairness
analysis is an incomplete normative theory.' 8 5 Using the absence of
envy as a criterion for fairness does not aid in assessing the trade-off
between distributional equity and the social or allocative benefits that
these remedial options provide.'8 6 Furthermore, the incidence of the
regulatory change may be inconsistent with the distributional goal be-
cause it is impossible to predict a priori who will bear the cost of the
regulation of credit terms.' 8 7 If supply is elastic and demand is not
(along the relevant range), creditors will be able to raise the price of
credit to reflect the distributional change, and thus the burden of the
regulation will rest largely on those debtors who pay. The polar ex-
treme is the case in which supply is inelastic and demand is elastic
(again within the relevant range). Under these conditions, creditors
will increase price only slightly or not at all, and the distribution will
have the desired effect. The common assumption about capital markets
is that barriers to entry and exit are low, implying that supply is elas-
tic.18 8 Thus, it is likely that at least some of the burden of the regula-
tion will fall on debtors who pay.
Perhaps more telling is the argument that those debtors who pay
will be doubly burdened. Not only will they bear the distributional
185. A more complete theory of fairness would demand that the distribution be
assessed as fair (under the chosen criterion) in terms of both incremental and end-state
results. Furthermore, this distribution is likely to be only partially superfair-that is, no
individual will envy the end-state distribution of the key consumption good held by the
other, even though many might prefer the total bundle of entitlements held by the other.
Finally, the superfairness criterion does not rule out all forms of envy. It only isolates
the preferences for one's own consumption bundle. Thus, a superfair distribution does
not imply that no one would prefer the total utility of any other. A more demanding
criterion is the concept of superequality-an end-state distribution that yields each indi-
vidual a utility level equal to or better than an equal division of all commodities. See W.
Baumol, supra note 180, at 33-36. Given the current state of fairness analysis (in which
the same criteria can yield different outcomes), the argument should be regarded as
suggestive only.
186. Pazner and Schmeidler have proved that end-state distributional superfairness
is not, in general, compatible with Pareto optimality. Thus, there are cases in which no
outcome is both efficient and fair. See Pazner & Schmeidler, supra note 180, at 674-75.
Pazner and Schmeidler propose a criterion called "egalitarian equivalence" that pur-
ports to reconcile this conflict. An allocation is egalitarian equivalent if the distribution
of utility could have been achieved by an equal division of all commodities. Id. at 672.
Crawford has used this criterion to develop an auction procedure in which the
chooser can select either one of the bundles offered by the divider (an auction) or the
equal division bundle. This result yields a distribution that is both efficient and fair (in
egalitarian-equivalent terms). See Crawford, A. Procedure for Generating Pareto-
Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations, 47 Econometrica 49, 51-52 (1979).
187. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost
of Procedural Due Process, 61 Va. L. Rev. 807, 836 (1975).
188. See Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1977, at 13, 19-21, 23-24.
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costs in higher interest rates,18 9 but the regulation will deprive them of
an effective instrument for self-command, one that would have reduced
the expected risk of default. In short, even if end-state fairness is used
as the criterion, it can still be argued that this distribution is not really
superfair. Those debtors who anticipate being able to discipline their
subsequent behavior to ensure repayment would, if they were aware of
the economic reality of the matter, envy the distribution of control to
those more likely to default. This is because the latter group benefits
from an insurance policy largely subsidized by the former.
The puzzle, then, is how to account for the appeal of a distribu-
tional theory that disadvantages the many in order to benefit the few.
One explanation is that the persistence of these regulatory initiatives
depends more on the illusion of equity than on its reality.1 90 Consider
the link between superfairness analysis, which focuses on an individ-
ual's perceptions of her share of any distribution, and the current re-
search on economic illusions. For instance, the "endowment effect"
follows from the human tendency to evaluate future choices in terms of
gains and losses using the status quo as the anchoring point.' 9 ' This
illusion leads individuals to weight out-of-pocket losses more heavily
than foregone gains of equal expected value.' 92 All things being equal,
goods that are included in the individual's current endowment will be
more highly valued than those that have not been acquired. Systematic
underevaluation of opportunity cost thus causes a bias in an individ-
ual's perceptions of his utility.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of loss aversion may also affect per-
ceptions depending on theform in which the costs are imposed.' 93 For
example, the evidence suggests that people prefer making multiple,
small payments rather than a single, concentrated payment.' 9 4 This il-
lusion explains voluntary excess income tax withholding as well as the
evidence that lower income earners prefer a regressive sales tax to a
189. This problem is finessed in superfairness analysis by the concept of partial
distributional fairness. A distribution is partially fair in terms of a defined subset of
commodities (such as postdefault leverage) "if no individual is willing to exchange his
holdings of those items for any other person's so that no one envies any other person's
holdings of those items alone. W. Baumol, supra note 180, at 62-63.
190. This is not to say that the illusion of equity necessarily justifies the prohibition
of terms that may well have positive benefits for debtors who do not default. Rather, the
superfairness idea is a competing normative theory-one that willingly sacrifices the so-
cial benefits forecast by the cooperative model to achieve a distribution of entitlements
that is perceived as "fairer."
191. This analysis builds on Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, 73 Pub.
Interest 60, 64 (1973).
192. See supra note 124.
193. The terminology is from Kahneman and Tversky. See Kahneman & Tversky,
Choices, supra note 125, at 344-46. The concept expresses the intuition that a loss of
$100 is more unpleasant than a gain of $100 is attractive. This explains the observed
reluctance of individuals to wager on a 50/50 chance, such as a coin flip.
194. W. Baumol, supra note 180, at 211-12.
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progressive income tax. 195 The regulation of coercive creditor reme-
dies may trigger both of these economic illusions. The benefits from
coercive collection are both diffuse and expectational. The losses that
result from postdefault collection are large and out-of-pocket. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that the regulation of coercive rem-
edies is commonly perceived as distributively fair.
The pervasiveness of these illusions is relevant to the very concept
of fairness. Indeed, this connection suggests that the salient factor for
legal policy is the effect of cognitive illusions on individuals' perceptions
rather than their judgments.196 Assume that the costs of the distribu-
tional change are, in fact, divided unequally between debtors who de-
fault and those who do not, but that the debtors who do not default are
under the illusion that they, too, have received the better share of the
distribution. Under the criterion of superfairness, the distribution is
equitable as long as one group does not envy the other group. On this
view, what is significant is not the distribution the individual actually
receives, but the pleasure he obtains from it.1
9 7
The preceding analysis suggests why policymakers often choose
regulatory reforms that have uneven distributional effects. Concen-
trated costs are weighted more heavily by decision makers than are dif-
fused costs precisely because the latter are not perceived as costs at all.
Thus, to conclude, as I do, that the prohibition of self-enforcing reme-
dies rests on a perception of fairness is not to dismiss the significance of
that perception. The social benefits that are provided by access to cred-
ible commitments are undervalued. The social costs of those mecha-
nisms when debtors default are magnified. It is this very illusion that is
captured in the conception of "lost value."
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for a reconceptualization of the regulation
195. Id. at 219-20.
196. This point develops an argument I have made elsewhere. See Scott, supra
note 109, at 330-37. The vast literature on human error and cognitive illusion has been
misunderstood by legal analysts. I contend that the focus on correcting errors ofjudg-
ment is misplaced because the process of judgment involves several interrelated
processes, including the method by which an individual manages her choices. Further-
more, linking the research to poorjudgment inevitably leads to the problematic assump-
tion that legal regulation can correct inherently fallible behavior. The connection to
perceptions is more suggestive because it treats the cognitive illusions as a constraint
and not a variable. Thus, the question is rephrased in terms of how the evidence of
these illusions illuminates some basic legal institutions, including the notion of distribu-
tive fairness.
197. W. Baumol, slipra note 180, at 221. It is important to remember that these
illusions are ingrained in individual judgments and perceptions precisely because they
are so useful in ameliorating the stresses of decision making. The error or illusion that
this research illuminates is the deviation between empirically observed behavior and




of self-enforcing remedies. A necessary first step is to. clarify the objec-
tives of regulatory reform. The stated reasons for prohibiting certain
remedies are to protect defaulting debtors against coercive threats and
lost-value executions. But a single-minded focus on postdefault en-
forcement distorts the analysis. A cooperative bargaining model of
consumer credit suggests, to the contrary, that these self-enforcing
terms also have a beneficial function in reinforcing the parties' commit-
ment to the contractual objective.
Thus conceived, the current scheme of regulation is difficult to jus-
tify on either economic or paternalistic grounds. The assumption of
market failure cannot be sustained once the considerable ex ante bene-
fits. of self-enforcing terms are acknowledged. Indeed, the analysis
shows that the risk of creditor exploitation is more acute when the cred-
itor takes a security interest in consumer durables (currently unregu-
lated) than in cases in which the security interest is taken in household
goods or wage assignments (currently prohibited). Furthermore, the
undesirable coercion associated with postdefault enforcement is better
reduced by disclosure and other information-based forms of regula-
tion. The idea of personal integrity provides an alternative basis for
prohibiting certain kinds of agreements that impair personal freedom
and self-respect, but the debtor's ability to depersonalize the commit-
ment with a monetary payment argues against such paternalistic inter-
ventions here.
Perhaps the lost-value rhetoric masks a different objective: the so-
cial interest in restraining the overconsumption of credit. On these
terms, regulating self-enforcing remedies may serve a credit-rationing
function, increasing the cost and thus reducing the supply of credit.
The case for overconsumption rests on either of two bases. Pervasive
social insurance and other debt-forgiveness policies may lead individu-
als to assume too much risk in personal credit decisions. In addition,
cognitive errors may reinforce impulsiveness and other manifestations
of poor judgment. Nevertheless, regulation on these grounds is per-
verse. If social insurance and other factors lead individuals to overcon-
sume credit, the solution is to encourage individuals to internalize
some of these social costs. Self-enforcing terms function much like in-
surance deductibles, mitigating the moral hazard of social insurance.
Furthermore, the claim that individuals suffer from impulsive judgment
argues in favor of precommitment devices such as security interests and
wage assignments. If credit rationing is a desirable objective, then self-
enforcing remedies should be subsidized rather than prohibited.
The inadequacy of the alternative justifications suggests a final
possibility: lost value may be a proxy for distributional equity. The
regulation of coercive collection does redistribute postdefault leverage
from creditors to debtors who default. The distributional case is un-
dermined, however, by the fact that those debtors who do not default
are likely to bear much of the redistributional burden. Despite this
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problem, the illusion that causes concentrated losses to overwhelm dif-
fused gains may cause each affected individual to prefer her end-state
distribution to that of any other individual. If the criterion for distribu-
tional equity is the absence of envy, then the perception of fairness may
also be the reality. The idea that policy is motivated by an aversion to
concentrated losses does offer the most plausible positive account of
the regulation of self-enforcing remedies.
The analysis thus seems to generate radically different implica-
tions. So long as the question is framed in terms of the prohibition of
certain remedies, the normative arguments push toward all-or-nothing
solutions to the problem of coercive collection. The bargaining theory
approach argues against direct prohibition of consensually based reme-
dies. On the other hand, superfaimess analysis supports broad re-
straint on postdefault coercion. It is tempting to argue that these
opposing corner solutions are not helpful in formulating more finely
honed or discriminating policy prescriptions. But the binary choice-
complete prohibition or no regulation-is not an inevitable one. The
all-or-nothing character of the analysis is dictated by the current preoc-
cupation with selective prohibition.
Ultimately, however, the structural imperatives of the consumer
credit transaction cannot be ignored. If the coercion associated with
postdefault maneuvering is normatively undesirable, the most effective
solution is to ameliorate the information deficits that generate coercive
actions. Otherwise, selective regulation of particular terms will inevita-
bly be trumped by the pressure for substitute enforcement mecha-
nisms. So long as it is true that reciprocal commitments contribute to
the regulation of consumer credit, debtors who default will be subject
to contractually created coercion of one sort or another. Some com-
mentators have suggested that parties should be encouraged to use less
coercive forms of enforcement, such as income execution.' 98 But such
indirect attempts to reduce coercion will necessarily cause an increase
in the attractiveness of the economic hostage to creditors. Thus, in-
duced breaches and other manifestations of creditor misbehavior may
be the unhappy consequences of the current zeal to moderate the
psychic costs of postdefault leverage through the direct prohibition of
contract terms.
198. See, e.g., Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests, supra note 6,
at 970-74.
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